The future of the Middle East - Part 2
The Abraham Accords, escalation risks, and Israel’s reputational crisis
Israel’s military victories might be hollow if it loses the battle for international legitimacy. This second long article of three explores how errors, disinformation, cultural backlash, and lawfare might threaten Israel’s standing even as the Abraham Accords expand.
The Abraham Accords Expansion
While Israel’s adversaries regroup militarily, a parallel battle is being fought on the diplomatic front—one that could significantly alter their strategic calculations. The Abraham Accords, initially signed in 2020, are gaining renewed momentum. To secure a diplomatic legacy, Donald Trump has been actively promoting an expansion of these normalisation agreements. Reports suggest that Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have been coordinating on a major deal to follow up the military operations.
According to an Israel Hayom report, they envision a swift end to the Gaza war and then a broad expansion of the Abraham Accords to include major players like Saudi Arabia and even Syria. The prospect of Syria normalising relations with Israel would have been dismissed as fantasy not long ago, but with Assad gone, a new Syrian leadership might be more receptive, especially with US backing (and financial motivation). Saudi Arabia, for its part, had already been moving towards a deal with Israel before the war (there were hints of progress in 2023 before Hamas’s attack disrupted it). Trump is now pushing to revive those talks, presumably sweetening the deal with security guarantees and other incentives for the Saudis.
For Israel’s enemies, this diplomatic wave is highly concerning. Normalisation risks isolating Palestinian and Islamist movements, weakening the narrative that Arab and Muslim states will always oppose Israel. Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran have all criticised the Abraham Accords from the beginning. A senior Fatah official even claimed the accords were “one of the reasons” Hamas launched its massive attack on 7 October; essentially an attempt to derail the peace process by igniting war. Indeed, militants follow a spoiler’s playbook: when diplomatic progress is near, escalate violence to sabotage it. This was seen in the 1990s during the Oslo Peace Process, when Hamas and Islamic Jihad carried out suicide bombings to derail Israeli-PLO agreements. Now, with the expansion of the Abraham Accords, similar spoiler attempts are likely to follow.
For example, if Saudi-Israeli normalisation seems imminent, Iran or its proxies might stage an attack targeting Saudi interests, perhaps a missile strike on Riyadh from Yemen (Houthis) or sabotage of Saudi oil infrastructure to warn the kingdom that partnering with Israel has severe consequences. Likewise, Palestinian or Hezbollah militants could attempt a spectacular terrorist attack inside Israel or against Jewish targets worldwide, hoping a surge in violence would cause potential Arab allies to withdraw support for Israel.
The Abraham Accords pose an ideological challenge to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. These accords effectively marginalise the Palestinian issue in regional politics, at least at the state-to-state level. The militant camp will respond by attempting to keep the Palestine cause prominent. They will invoke pan-Arab and pan-Islamic sentiments, arguing that any Muslim who normalises relations with Israel is betraying Jerusalem and the Palestinian people. We have already witnessed public opinion backlash – for example, large protests in Bahrain, Jordan, and other places condemning Israel’s actions in Gaza and, by extension, their governments’ relations with Israel.
The governments involved in the Abraham Accords (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, etc.) managed the fallout of the Gaza war without withdrawing from the Accords. Still, they had to tread carefully: issuing condemnations of Israel’s bombardment to appease their populations while maintaining ties. Adversaries like Iran and Hezbollah will seek to widen that divide between the regimes and the people. They may covertly fund opposition groups or employ sympathetic clerics to denounce normalisation as religiously unacceptable. The Muslim world’s profound emotional connection with the Palestinian struggle remains a factor they will repeatedly exploit.
Another form of response is the development or strengthening of a counter-alliance. Iran has recently sought to improve relations with countries like China, Russia, and Turkey, presenting an “Eastern” or Islamic alternative to US-led coalitions. With the Abraham Accords effectively drawing Israel closer to several Sunni Arab states (and implicitly the US), Iran might intensify efforts through groups such as the “Axis of Resistance,” encouraging any country opposing Israel or Western dominance to cooperate.
We could see more overt strategic collaboration between Iran and organisations like the Taliban in Afghanistan or militant networks in Pakistan to disrupt US and allied interests, thereby increasing the cost of the US-brokered regional order. Iran will also focus on strengthening ties with the remaining rejectionist Arab actors: notably Iraq’s pro-Iran factions, Assad loyalists (if any persist), and perhaps Algeria (a country that has expressed opposition to normalisation). These initiatives aim to show that not everyone is aligning with Israel and that a unified front against Israel still exists.
From Israel’s perspective, expanding the Abraham Accords is partly about diplomatically encircling Iran and its proxies while building a regional coalition for stability that isolates the rejectionists. If Saudi Arabia and others join, Israel gains strategic advantages: overflight rights, intelligence sharing, and potential basing options that could be useful in a future confrontation with Iran. Conversely, Iran’s influence diminishes when Arab neighbours openly align with Israel. Recognising this, Tehran will see the battle for diplomatic influence as existential in its own right. We might observe Iran offering incentives to countries like Oman or Qatar to avoid taking the step towards normalisation. (Qatar, for instance, hosts Hamas’s political bureau; Iran will want it to remain in the anti-Israel camp, and Qatar’s mediation role in Gaza has given it a particular stance.)
In the extreme, if Trump’s ambitious plan were realised (for example, a scenario where a post-war Arab consortium takes control of Gaza’s administration, Hamas leaders are exiled, multiple Arab states establish peace with Israel, and even a notional two-state solution is proposed) that would pose a strategic nightmare for Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. It would mean the core grievances they exploit (the status of Gaza and the West Bank) might be addressed in a way that completely bypasses them. Their relevance would fade if Palestinians were to shift to new leadership under an international arrangement. Consequently, they would do everything possible to sabotage such a plan.
For instance, Hamas hardliners could incite unrest in Gaza against any international peacekeeping force or Arab administrators, possibly through terror cells left behind. Hezbollah might attempt to smuggle remaining arms to loyalists in Gaza or Sinai to keep the conflict alive. Iran might reject any diplomatic solutions to the Palestinian issue and oppose the two-state parameters, seeking to rally rejectionist factions of Palestinians to continue armed resistance (possibly under Iranian guidance). Essentially, the expansion of peace threatens to render the conflict axis obsolete, prompting those invested in conflict to strive to reignite it in some form.
Risks of miscalculation and escalation
The post-victory landscape is filled with new dangers alongside emerging opportunities. As Israel celebrates its tactical successes and seeks peace agreements, the inherent power imbalance may foster overconfidence and, conversely, lead to desperation among its adversaries, potentially causing reckless acts. Several risks stand out.
Multi-front flashpoints. Even when weakened, Israel’s enemies could coordinate a sudden escalation on several fronts. For example, Hezbollah (despite its losses) might one day choose to launch a limited volley of rockets “to save face,” while Iranian-backed militias in Syria or Iraq send drones into Israel. Although individually minor, these actions together could cause Israel to suspect a larger attack and respond with overwhelming force, possibly reigniting a multi-front war through misjudgment. With forces on high alert, an accident at the Lebanon or Gaza border, such as an exchange of fire that kills civilians, could escalate if either side misinterprets the other's intentions.
Terrorism and overreactions. A single terrorist attack could disrupt the peace. If a jihadist manages to execute a mass-casualty suicide bombing in an Israeli city or a high-profile assassination, Israeli leadership (buoyed by recent victories and perhaps less inclined to restraint) might retaliate not just against the immediate perpetrators but against what it perceives as the entire network, which could involve bombing Hamas/Hezbollah offices in Beirut or again striking IRGC assets openly. Such retaliation could, in turn, provoke Hezbollah or Iran to respond, thereby initiating a cycle. In a tense region, small sparks can ignite large fires.
Collapse of the Palestinian Authority. A subtler but significant risk is the potential collapse or implosion of the PA in the West Bank under the combined weight of public discontent and Israeli pressure. If Abbas’s government falls apart, Israel could suddenly find itself responsible for the entire West Bank’s security without a local partner. This scenario could lead to chaos (warring militias) or Israel reoccupying cities, both of which would fuel a new intifada. A power vacuum in the West Bank would be a prime opportunity for Hamas or Iran to step in, undoing one of Israel’s political victories (keeping the West Bank quieter during the Gaza war). It could also derail any emerging diplomatic agreements, as countries like Saudi Arabia would hesitate to normalise relations amid images of the PA’s demise and West Bank unrest.
Overreach by Israel or allies. Conversely, Israel and the US/Trump could overextend diplomatically. If the expansion of the Abraham Accords is seen as too blatant a move to undermine Palestinian aspirations, for instance, if Israel is perceived as annexing parts of the West Bank under the guise of new peace agreements (the Trump plan did suggest “limited sovereignty” for Israel in Judea/Samaria), this could provoke reactions not only from militants but also from moderate Arab states. A breakdown of the Accords under such circumstances could swing momentum back towards Iran by affirming their argument that only resistance yields results. Therefore, there is a risk that in the euphoria of victory and normalisation, Israel might take actions (such as expanding settlements or harming the Al-Aqsa mosque's status quo) that could reignite the broader conflict.
Humanitarian and legitimacy crises. Israel’s tactical victories came at a significant humanitarian cost, with the Gaza war toll being the obvious example. Without rebuilding and relief efforts for Gaza and Lebanon, the suffering risks fostering the next cycle of extremism. A generation of youth with nothing to lose in Gaza’s ruins or Lebanon’s shattered economy could be easily recruited by jihadist groups, potentially even more radical than Hamas or Hezbollah. We have seen how ISIS emerged from the chaos of post-war Iraq and Syria. A mistake by all parties would be to ignore the human security aspect: focusing solely on military and state-centric gains while popular grievances simmer. That powder keg could erupt unexpectedly, manifesting as new terrorist organisations or regional instability (refugee flows, etc.).
Israel’s adversaries will likely respond to defeat not with meek surrender, but with adaptable and at times devious strategies. Military options will shift to the asymmetric realm through insurgencies, terrorism, and covert attacks, as direct confrontations are off the table for now. Diplomatically and ideologically, these actors will try to undermine Israel’s new alliances and keep the flame of resistance alive through propaganda and political manoeuvring. In the short term, the region may experience a deceptive lull as all parties recover and pursue diplomatic efforts.
Beneath the surface, preparations for the next round are underway. Each actor is calculating how to turn today’s battlefield losses into tomorrow’s strategic advantages by other means. This delicate period holds both the promise of a new Middle East (if peace can be solidified) and the peril of an entrenched conflict taking on new forms.
The Reputational Cost
A steep political and reputational cost has come with Israel’s recent battlefield victories. On paper, the 12-Day War of 2025 was a swift military success for Jerusalem. Iranian nuclear sites struck, IRGC commanders eliminated, achieved at relatively low immediate cost to Israeli society. However, the psychological and diplomatic fallout from this “maximalist” approach has been less reassuring.
Israel’s dependence on US intervention during the war (after initially insisting it could act alone) created the impression of a client state dragging Washington into conflict, a perception even American supporters noted. US public opinion has become wary: polls show unfavourable views of Israel rising among younger Americans. For example, the percentage of Republicans under 50 with negative views increased from 35% in 2019 to 50% in 2025. On the political Left, rising millennial and Gen Z politicians openly support the Palestinian cause; a stark contrast to the ageing establishment’s instinctive pro-Israel stance. None of Israel’s battlefield victories can compensate for this “generational political loss” of support in the West. In Europe, too, public sentiment, especially among youth, has shifted towards scepticism or outright criticism of Israeli policies, diminishing the moral capital Israel once enjoyed as a beleaguered democracy.
Parallel to the kinetic war that began on 7 October 2023, Tehran and Doha have been conducting an aggressive information campaign. Iran, often collaborating with allies like Russia, has mobilised networks of online bots and fake social media accounts to flood discourse with anti-Israel narratives. Researchers observed an unprecedented rise in inauthentic activity since the conflict began, with some platforms seeing as many as 25–33% of accounts posting about the war being fake sock-puppets spreading disinformation. These influence operations produce disturbing images (real or manipulated), conspiracy theories, and false atrocity claims at a volume intended to overwhelm fact-based narratives.
Iran’s state media and propaganda outlets have vigorously promoted their messaging in multiple languages, aiming to portray Israel as an unambiguous aggressor. Simultaneously, Qatar’s global media and financial influence have amplified the campaign. Doha’s state-funded networks, most notably Al Jazeera, function as megaphones for Islamist and anti-Israel messaging. Through Al Jazeera’s coverage, Qatari propaganda elevates “resistance” jihad and denounces Israel, while fostering anti-Western sentiment.
Beyond media channels, Qatar and Iran use sympathetic cultural influencers and institutions worldwide. For instance, substantial Qatari donations to Western universities and think-tanks have helped embed pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel perspectives within elite discourse. The overall effect is a coordinated global narrative offensive: by spreading scepticism about Israel’s actions and intentions, Tehran and Doha seek to diplomatically isolate Israel and sway international public opinion, particularly in the Global South and among young Westerners, decisively against the Jewish state. This is not a new phenomenon (see below), but even in a few short years, social media has turbo-charged the problem.
In the cultural sphere, moments that would have been unthinkable a generation ago are now happening openly, to Israel’s detriment. A notable example occurred at Britain’s renowned Glastonbury Festival just last weekend, where popular music acts turned their stage performances into anti-Israel demonstrations. The Irish rap trio Kneecap performed draped in Palestinian keffiyeh scarves before a crowd of around 30,000 festival-goers, with hundreds waving Palestinian flags and chanting in solidarity.
On the same stage, UK punk duo Bob Vylan led the audience in a shocking chorus of “Death to the IDF”. Videos of these scenes, with giant Palestinian flags fluttering over cheering British youths, went viral worldwide. The fact that such rhetoric was celebrated (and not just confined to the fringes) at a mainstream music festival highlights a broader decline in Israel’s image among younger Western audiences. In the views of many in this emerging generation, Israel is no longer seen as a brave democracy under threat but rather as an aggressive Goliath oppressing a weaker people. This shifting perception, heavily influenced by online activism and cultural influencers, poses a significant long-term challenge. Tomorrow’s Western voters and leaders might feel considerably less inclined to defend Israel on the world stage than their parents or grandparents.
Adding to Israel's challenges is a rising tide of international legal and diplomatic pressure; an example of “lawfare” used by opponents who cannot defeat Israel militarily. Over the past year, Israel has faced a barrage of war crimes allegations and investigations in multilateral forums. Most notably, in 2024, the International Criminal Court (ICC) took the unprecedented step of seeking arrest warrants against sitting Israeli leaders, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, for actions related to military operations. This move sparked outrage in Jerusalem and scepticism among Israel's allies, but it indicated that the ICC has become a battleground where Israel’s critics push allegations of “atrocities.”
At the United Nations, Israel increasingly finds itself on the defensive. In July 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered an advisory opinion stating that Israel's ongoing presence in the Palestinian territories breaches international law. Soon after, in September, a large majority in the UN General Assembly approved a resolution demanding that Israel “end without delay its unlawful presence” in occupied territory within one year. Israeli officials condemned the resolution as nothing short of “diplomatic terrorism.” Nonetheless, its passing (by 124 votes to 14) exposed Israel’s isolation outside the West.
Arab and Muslim states, supported by many African, Asian, and Latin American nations, now routinely introduce resolutions condemning Israel’s actions in Gaza and the West Bank and gain backing from a significant segment of the international community. The Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), for example, have heightened their rhetoric, accusing Israel of “systematic crimes” against Palestinians, with some leaders employing the term “genocide” to describe Israel's campaign in Gaza. Such language, once confined to activist NGOs, is now heard at the ICJ, at high-profile summits and UN sessions by heads of state and government.
Even major powers within the BRICS/Global South bloc have joined in the censure. China has supported UN calls for a ceasefire and negotiations. At the same time, Russia’s UN ambassador boldly claimed that Israel has “no right to self-defence” under international law as an occupying power. These legal and diplomatic efforts (ICC investigations, ICJ case and opinions, UN resolutions, war-crimes dossiers) constitute a coordinated asymmetric strategy to undermine Israel’s legitimacy. They entangle Israel and its officials in a web of investigations and adverse judgements, aiming to portray the country as a rogue state in the court of global opinion.
From Washington to Johannesburg, London to Riyadh, the impacts of these trends are transforming Israel’s strategic landscape. In the West, governments still largely support Israel militarily today, but they govern publics that are far more divided on the issue than before. Importantly, the next generation of Western political leaders is coming of age in an environment of unprecedented criticism of Israel. The energetic core of the American Left now includes openly pro-Palestinian voices, and even within the right-wing base, unwavering pro-Israel sentiment is “old and getting older”.
In Europe, rising progressive movements make Israel’s treatment of Palestinians a litmus test issue. Youth-led climate and social justice activists often connect the Palestinian cause to their broader anti-colonial and human rights agendas. Beyond the West, much of the Global South views the Israel-Palestine conflict through a post-colonial perspective, tending to sympathise with Palestinian “resistance” and resent what they see as Western double standards. This has resulted in less diplomatic support for Israel and a greater willingness to entertain Chinese or Russian narratives portraying Israel (and by extension the US) as in breach of international law.
All of this poses a serious long-term strategic threat to Israel. The country’s security has always depended not only on its military strength but also on a degree of international acceptance; a sense that Western powers “have Israel’s back” and that Israel remains, broadly speaking, the “good guy” in a difficult neighbourhood. That perception is fading. If, in a decade, the US or EU is led by politicians who came of age amid relentless social-media campaigns against “Israeli apartheid” and who face electorates hostile to Israel, Israel could find its diplomatic shield full of holes.
A military victory at the tactical level will mean little if Israel becomes a pariah in the court of public opinion. Iran and its allies understand this: by eroding Israel’s reputation, they aim to achieve through narrative what they cannot through force of arms. Following the Seven Front War, which began on 7th October, Iran’s regime and their allies can plausibly claim victory on this undeclared eighth front.
Israel has dominated militarily, but has been diminished politically. Israel may have won on the battlefield, but Iran “won” the war on perception on the global stage. For Israel, the challenge ahead is to restore its standing and counter disinformation and legal challenges, lest it wake up to find that military superiority offers cold comfort in the face of diplomatic isolation and a new generation of Western leaders unwilling to provide support. Part Three of this long piece will address how Israel can achieve this.
Conclusion
Israel’s extensive tactical victories have unquestionably shifted the balance of power, but they have not resolved the conflict. Instead, they have redirected it into new avenues. As discussed in Part One, Hamas, Hezbollah, West Bank militants, and Iran are all engaging in varying combinations of rear-guard actions, strategic patience, and reimagined warfare. History shows that such ideological conflicts pitting state power against non-state or quasi-state resistance are seldom conclusively settled on the battlefield. Instead, they evolve and persist until underlying political grievances are addressed.
What makes this moment particularly complex is that Israel’s military dominance has been accompanied by a notable decline in its international reputation. Disinformation campaigns, cultural backlash, legal disputes, and the alienation of younger Western generations represent a long-term strategic threat that no Iron Dome can counter. The next generation of Western leaders may emerge not from pro-Israel consensus but from campus protests and online outrage. If Israel becomes diplomatically isolated just as it secures battlefield supremacy, it risks winning tactical victories but losing the global narrative war.
The present moment, with its triumphs and realignments, could act as a turning point: either the region moves towards a lasting realignment that incorporates Israel and marginalises violent rejectionists, or those rejectionists find ways to adapt and resurface, plunging the region back into armed conflict. The greatest risk is overreach: that Israel, emboldened by victory, underestimates the political costs of its actions and fails to counter the ideological and legal offensives being waged against it.
Sustainable peace depends not only on deterrence but also on legitimacy. This might mean including Palestinian political rights within the framework of the Abraham Accords so that normalisation is not seen as a betrayal. It could also involve reclaiming the moral high ground through transparency, accountability, and restraint. For Iran and its proxies, the way forward may still include resistance, but also recalibration as their old strategies become less effective. For Israel, the next chapter hinges on whether it can combine hard power with soft power, achieving battlefield victories while maintaining global credibility.
Perception shapes policy. Israel may find that in a world driven by algorithms, imagery, and manipulation of international law, reputation is as vital a battleground as the battlefield itself.
Tomorrow’s final instalment in the trilogy offers the solution to all the issues identified so far: a strategic roadmap for long-term peace. Drawing on months of research, it outlines what Israel, the US, and Gulf States can do to defeat asymmetric threats, restore legitimacy, support Palestinian governance, and secure a stable Middle East.
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