The Future of the Middle East - Part 3

Solving the issue of Palestine once and for all

Parts One and Two of this series examined how Israel’s enemies are likely to react to defeat, and how the Abraham Accords, strategic miscalculations, and Israel’s international reputational damage will shape the future. I have had to split Part 3 in half because it is so extensive. So, you get four parts for the price of three! Part Four will look at the broader region.

Introduction

Israel’s military advances against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon have reshaped the wider conflict environment in Israel’s favour, but true victory depends on winning the peace. That involves breaking the link between extremist groups and the civilians they manipulate, and creating a new political future for Palestinians that rejects absolute ideologies. Traditional methods, from Global War on Terror-style counterinsurgency occupations to endless delays in “two-state solution” talks, will continue to fall short of answering the question.

Instead, I propose a localised strategy to empower grassroots leadership, cut off Hamas’s lifelines, and redefine Palestinian governance on terms that support coexistence. Here is my roadmap for Gaza and the West Bank. It focuses on separating Gaza’s people from Hamas’s control and promoting the ideological demise of “Palestinianism” (Arafat’s rejectionist vision of replacing Israel) in favour of pragmatic, decentralised self-rule. My goal is a sustainable peace built from the ground up, aligning with regional peace efforts while avoiding the risks of legitimising violent actors.

Gaza

Instead of relying on the failed model of NATO-style counterinsurgency, Gaza’s liberation from Hamas must come by harnessing Gaza’s social fabric against the militants. Gazan society is well known for being clan-based. Extended families and local leaders hold deep loyalty. While Hamas’s Islamist movement has been dominant for years, it is not universally loved; Gazan groups on Telegram are full of hatred of Hamas for having brought ruin upon the Strip.

Some well-armed clans are actively resisting their rule. For example, the Abu Shabab clan in Rafah openly rejected Hamas’s authority and accused the militants of damaging Gaza’s interests. In response, Hamas has issued an ultimatum for the clan leader to surrender on charges of “treason”. The clan dismissively called Hamas’s threats “a sitcom that doesn’t frighten us or any free man who loves his homeland”.

This dramatic standoff highlights a key opportunity: to empower and protect these rival families and community networks, enabling them to stand up to Hamas from within. By arming and coordinating with additional anti-Hamas clans, such as the Khalas clan in Gaza City and a faction in Khan Younis, Israel can increase local pressure on Hamas.

Israel can strengthen organic Gazan resistance. They must, however, learn the lesson from Iraq, where US forces once supported Sunni tribal “Awakening” movements against Al-Qaeda. The Sunni Sahwa collapsed the minute US forces withdrew, because the plan never aligned with the political objectives of Iraq’s pro-Shia government. By giving factions autonomy and an enduring model that is not reliant on the IDF, Israel and its allies can weaken Hamas’s control without a permanent occupation.

Every village elder or influential family that turns against Hamas becomes another foothold of legitimate local authority. Most importantly, these grassroots actors have credibility that external forces lack, and their success diminishes Hamas’s narrative of “resistance” by providing Gazans with a domestic alternative source of order and services.

Beyond the battlefield, even after more than twenty months, Hamas continues to maintain its power through control of resources and patronage. Any strategy must sever the financial umbilical cords and dismantle the shadow governance mechanisms that support Hamas. Nowhere is this more urgent than in the area of international aid. Over the years, Hamas has notoriously siphoned off humanitarian aid meant for ordinary Gazans, diverting it to its fighters or selling it on the black market to fund terror.

Captured internal documents confirm that Hamas has been systematically exploiting aid inflows during the war, confiscating between 15% and 25% of all aid entering Gaza to stockpile supplies for its militants or to extort cash from civilians. The IDF even found records of Hamas agreeing to new tax splits on aid (for example, allotting 7% to its Qassam Brigades and additional kickbacks to its government officials). Hamas gunmen have seized food convoys, skimming off fuel and flour, and then reselling necessities to desperate residents at exorbitant prices.

This mafia-like operation not only enriches Hamas’s coffers but also solidifies its power. Gazans become reliant on the very group stealing from them. To break this cycle, the international community and Israel must reroute and rigorously oversee aid to ensure it bypasses Hamas entirely. Any aid system that passes through Hamas-controlled ministries or cronies should be dismantled. Instead, establish transparent channels operated by neutral entities, such as local councils and Gaza Humanitarian Foundation-style NGOs, which are free from Hamas influence.

Palestinians receive food parcels in Gaza City on Thursday (Jehad Alshrafi / AP)

There is a precedent for this: during the war, a consortium of Gaza-based civil society groups, rival factions, and clans formed a “Higher Commission for Tribal Affairs” to safeguard aid deliveries. When Israel temporarily halted some aid after observing masked men on relief trucks, these clan leaders publicly denied that they were Hamas fighters, insisting they were tribal guards protecting the shipments from theft. At times during the war, clans and community organisations have stepped up to escort convoys and ensure aid reaches civilians during the conflict, explicitly excluding Hamas from the process. This model should be expanded. Let Gaza’s trusted community elders, with Israeli oversight, manage distribution and bar any Hamas members or affiliates from involvement. Such efforts strip Hamas of a key lever of control. If they can no longer act as gatekeepers to food, medicine, and jobs, their claim to represent the people diminishes. Of course, this does not guarantee that any Gazan clan will like Israel any more than Hamas does, especially after nearly two years of war. I will address this issue in more detail later. For now, this is the short-term solution.

Despite unproven allegations of atrocities at distribution sites intended to discredit the scheme, all humanitarian and reconstruction aid should adhere to the GHF template moving forward. The scale of the disinformation campaign against it shows Hamas’s panic over this. Its success is apparent, with millions of meals already distributed. From now on, funds and supplies from Gulf states, Europe, and international agencies must be channelled through monitored structures like GHF or similar, with strict transparency and audits to ensure no “terror tax” is skimmed off.

Projects such as rebuilding homes, hospitals, and infrastructure can be contracted to firms vetted to have no ties to Hamas (potentially even involving Palestinian technocrats from the diaspora or the West Bank). By conditioning every dollar of aid on non-violence and non-corruption (essentially a “reconstruction for demilitarisation” agreement), ordinary Gazans will see that prosperity only comes when Hamas is absent. Over time, if new housing and jobs only reach areas free from Hamas influence, the population’s incentive to reject the militants will increase.

A security guard gestures at a checkpoint manned by US and Egyptian security at the Netzarim corridor, as displaced Palestinians make their way from the south to the northern parts of the Gaza Strip. Photograph: Omar Al-Qattaa/AFP/Getty Images

Security in post-Hamas Gaza is crucial, but it must not take the form of a heavy foreign army presence that could incite local resentment. The Western experience in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated the dangers of being perceived as occupiers. A direct IDF “clear, hold, build” counterinsurgency campaign in Gaza would be counterproductive and is hopefully not considered to be a viable option. Instead, Israel and regional partners should discreetly prepare an Arab-led stabilisation force or administrative group to help maintain order once Hamas’s control is broken.

For example, Egypt (which shares culture and dialect with Gazans) could coordinate policing in partnership with local clan-based security committees. In parallel, Palestinian Authority technocrats could be invited to help rebuild essential services, such as utilities, schools, and clinics. But unlike past proposals, this must not amount to parachuting the discredited PA or an international army into Gaza against the locals’ will. The key is to prevent a security vacuum without imposing a foreign yoke.

One idea is a temporary mandate in Gaza jointly run by a coalition of Arab states and international monitors. Such an interim administration could oversee the transition, while empowering local municipal councils and respected community figures as the true face of governance. This would, however, require Israeli oversight, as too many international NGOs and the UN have now proven themselves tainted beyond usefulness, through sympathy for Hamas and antipathy towards Israel. There is no place for them in this conversation.

The message to Gazans should be clear: your cities are now protected by your neighbours and supported by regional allies, not by occupiers. As stability establishes itself, these local authorities can develop into formal governance bodies, whether reconstituted town councils or new autonomous emirates that serve their people, rather than a jihadist hierarchy.

The Witkoff Plan

The Trump administration has been eager to broker a headline-grabbing ceasefire. US special envoy Steve Witkoff’s 60-day Gaza ceasefire proposal secured Israel’s approval and was presented to Hamas as a roadmap. On the surface, the plan appears humanitarian: a pause in fighting, hostage releases, and negotiations toward a “permanent” ceasefire. However, I believe this plan has serious strategic flaws; most notably, that it risks maintaining Hamas’s power and even granting it long-term legitimacy as a political actor.

Under the plan, once Hamas agrees to a ceasefire and releases a limited number of Israeli hostages, Israel would respond by pulling back the IDF from parts of Gaza and suspending offensive operations for two months. Negotiations during this period would include arrangements relating to the ‘day after’ in Gaza and discussions of Israeli withdrawals and security measures, with mediators such as Qatar and Egypt brokering talks. In effect, Hamas is treated as a legitimate stakeholder in Gaza’s future governance during these talks. This is a stark departure from the policy of isolating and dismantling Hamas. By giving Hamas a seat at the table, the ceasefire framework risks cementing the group’s political stature just as it is militarily on the ropes.

It is not difficult to see how Hamas could exploit such a ceasefire: survive 60 days, claim victory for standing toe-to-toe with Israel and the US, and emerge with its leadership and arsenal damaged but still functional and recoverable. Hamas has responded to the US proposal with positive noises, not outright rejection, but sought amendments that would advance its agenda. Hamas’s counter-demands included a complete Israeli withdrawal from all of Gaza, an end to the war (no resumption of fighting after 60 days), unrestricted flow of goods and people through the Rafah crossing, and substantial aid to rebuild Gaza’s infrastructure. Essentially, Hamas asked that the ceasefire become permanent on its terms, ensuring it would remain the de facto ruler in Gaza once the dust settles.

From Hamas’s perspective, this makes perfect sense. After suffering heavy losses, what better way to avoid total defeat than by securing a truce that freezes the front lines and forces Israel to halt its campaign? The Witkoff Plan, as proposed, did not require Hamas’s immediate disarmament or removal from power; those issues were deferred to later negotiations. History shows that terrorists rarely volunteer to disarm once they have obtained concessions. A “temporary” freeze can quickly turn into a prolonged stalemate that allows Hamas to regroup, rearm, and solidify its rule under the cover of diplomatic talks. The plan also suggested large prisoner exchanges (potentially over one thousand hardened militants, released in exchange for dozens of hostages).

While freeing Israeli hostages is a vital objective, such one-sided swaps strengthen Hamas’s stature. They can boast of forcing Israel into mass prisoner releases once again, reinforcing the narrative that kidnapping and violence produce political gains. However, we face the eternal question: if this is the only option Hamas will agree to, how else can the hostages be returned? Israel may have to choose between the hostages and Hamas’s removal. These two things continue to remain mutually exclusive. There is a brutal calculus for Israelis to confront: what is more important? The lives of some 20 hostages, or the potential for future peaceful coexistence in the Middle East? At this stage, it seems unlikely that both these things are possible.

The most insidious consequence of the Witkoff ceasefire is the legitimisation it gives Hamas. If this plan were to be implemented, Hamas leaders would be negotiating with a US envoy and regional governments as recognised parties to a conflict, not as fugitives or war criminals. A 60-day truce might easily be extended further if talks make progress, and before long, the world could become accustomed to the idea of Hamas remaining in charge of Gaza indefinitely (albeit “restrained” by agreements).

International pressure would likely increase on Israel to turn the ceasefire into a lasting peace agreement that includes Hamas. Essentially, Hamas’s continued control, which Israel aimed to prevent, would be restored through diplomatic means. The United States will find itself endorsing aspects of Hamas’s role. The draft framework already states that President Trump will personally announce the deal and commit to ensuring its successful implementation. At worst, Trump’s deal gives us a scenario where Hamas, rather than being defeated, is instead granted long-term authority in Gaza under international legitimacy, with billions in reconstruction funds at its disposal and no guarantee it will not resume its hostilities whenever it pleases.

This is a recipe for strategic backlash: an emboldened Hamas, flush with cash and legitimacy, could rebuild its terror infrastructure behind the shield of a US-brokered peace. The group’s leaders would also gain enormous political capital in the Palestinian arena. They will have stood up to Israel and Trump and “won,” which could undercut more moderate Palestinian voices for a generation. Such outcomes would gravely undermine the core strategic objective of the war, which was to break Hamas’s grip forever.

Why would Israel and their allies pursue such a disastrous scenario? The answer lies partly in the hostage situation and partly in the realm of politics. President Trump, always the dealmaker, is eager for a significant victory he can showcase internationally: a Gaza agreement secured by his administration, hostages returning home, and the guns falling silent, all presumably announced with fanfare at the White House. Taking into account domestic politics, delivering peace (even if fragile and fleeting) could be highly beneficial for Trump; from his perspective, it only needs to last three years. It would echo his success with the 2020 Abraham Accords and would be presented as a remarkable achievement early in his presidency. Trump’s team has been very active: sending envoy Witkoff to shuttle between capitals, coordinating with Qatar and Egypt, and publicly indicating that an agreement was near. For his part, Netanyahu has agreed to the plan, caught on the horns of having to placate the far-right in his coalition and the need to keep Trump onside (especially in light of Trump’s recent supportive tirades against Bibi’s ongoing legal troubles).

However, short-term political gains should not override long-term security wisdom. Washington policymakers must recall the lesson of past Middle East diplomacy: a poor peace can be worse than war. Legitimising Hamas for the sake of a 60-day pause is a devil’s bargain that sacrifices future stability for a brief period of calm. It would be similar to granting Al-Qaeda or ISIS political control over territory solely because they temporarily agreed to cease fighting.

The better course, even if it means a longer, harder military campaign now, is to truly finish the job of eradicating Hamas’s military capability and authority, while alleviating humanitarian suffering, all through the means discussed. The US can still chalk up a diplomatic win by helping to assemble the post-Hamas governance structure (perhaps an Arab stabilisation mission or a refurbished Palestinian administration that excludes Hamas). Encouraging Arab states to take part-ownership of Gaza’s recovery would align with Trump’s broader regional approach and the Abraham Accords framework.

President Trump may long to stand in the Oval Office and declare “peace in Gaza,” but he should ask: peace on whose terms? A deal that indirectly supports Hamas is not a victory for America, Israel, or the people of Gaza; it is a delayed defeat. The only winners are Hamas, the hostages and their families (and even then, it seems only some of them). The IDF’s 3,000+ casualties and their hard-won effort to eliminate terror would be wasted. Instead of strengthening Palestinian moderates, it would reward Hamas with the honours of resistance.

Strategically, legitimising Hamas now could likely pave the way for an even bloodier conflict in the future; a “peace” that allows the enemy time to prepare for the next round. US leaders and Israel’s government must resist the tempting lure of an easy agreement and adhere to the principled demand: Hamas, as it exists, cannot be part of Gaza’s future. Any ceasefire must be a step towards Hamas’s disarmament and departure. Otherwise, it is a trap.

West Bank

While Gaza needs a physical strategy to remove Hamas, the confrontation in the West Bank is just as much about ideas as politics. At the centre of the conflict is what Einat Wilf calls “Palestinianism”: an ideology focused not on creating a Palestinian state alongside Israel, but on denying the legitimacy of the Jewish state altogether. This concept, cultivated over generations through Palestinian media, education, and politics, has been the main barrier to peace. It means that even the supposedly moderate Palestinian Authority (PA) shares, at its core, Hamas’s ultimate aim: a future with no Israel. As Wilf plainly states, “Hamas is merely the most brutal and recent executive arm of Palestinianism, but the Palestinian Authority shares the same vision of no Jewish state.”

In other words, the difference lies in tactics (violent jihad versus diplomatic isolation), not in ultimate aims. This sobering reality check explains why decades of two-state negotiations have failed. No amount of border-drawing or institution-building can succeed if one side’s guiding ethos remains the elimination of the other side’s nationhood. Therefore, a key strategic goal for Israel and any genuine peace broker must be the complete discrediting and abandonment of the maximalist Palestinian narrative. The dream of reversing 1948, of a single Arab state “from the river to the sea,” must be abandoned for Palestinians to live and prosper truly. This does not mean denying Palestinian rights or identity, but instead redefining that identity away from a zero-sum anti-Zionism toward constructive nation-building.

How can one dismantle an ideology? Partly by revealing its uselessness and promoting alternative visions. Recent events have shown clearly that holding onto absolutism results in disaster for Palestinians. The Hamas-led war that started on 7 October has brought nothing but destruction to Gaza and economic stagnation to the West Bank. Yet, even after this disaster, the PA leadership under Mahmoud Abbas could not bring itself to break away from the rejectionist stance—a clear sign that old patterns remain.

Yasser Arafat, the inventor of the modern concept of “Palestine”.

To change course, a new generation of Palestinian leaders and Arab thinkers must openly confront the failure of Palestinianism. The US and Arab states should emphasise this message: the door to peace and statehood is open, but only if Palestinians step through it without the burdens of irredentism. This may require tough love, for example, conditioning diplomatic support and funding on PA leaders renouncing the goal of “return” to Jaffa or Haifa, removing incitement from school textbooks, and publicly recognising Israel’s permanence. It also involves educating the Palestinian public, especially young people, about the advantages of a future of coexistence over endless conflict. We must be realistic: an ideological shift of this magnitude will not occur overnight, and it cannot be imposed from outside. However, by explicitly prioritising Palestinianism’s defeat as a strategic goal, Israel and its allies set the foundation for fostering pragmatic voices over rejectionist ones.

Meanwhile, the more mundane work of reforming the Palestinian Authority should proceed with a clear and pragmatic approach. The PA in the West Bank is severely flawed: aged, plagued by corruption and nepotism, and losing its legitimacy among the population. Israel and the West have long sought to support the PA as the better alternative to Hamas. Financial aid funds PA salaries, and security training is provided so PA forces can maintain order and counter militants. These efforts must continue to avoid a power vacuum or a Hamas takeover in the West Bank. The collapse of the PA could unleash chaos and a wave of violence. Hence, measures such as strengthening professional technocrats within the PA, implementing anti-corruption oversight, and potentially arranging leadership succession (considering 87-year-old Abbas’s fragile health) are valuable. Again, none of this is easy, nor will the pathway be smooth.

Washington could assist in mediating an internal PA transition to a more credible leader or even promote Palestinian elections if circumstances stabilise. However, we must be clear: simply rebooting the PA will not address the fundamental issue if that new leadership still sustains the ideology of maximalist nationalism. We may end up with a marginally more efficient bureaucracy that continues to glorify “resistance” in subtler ways. Therefore, PA reform is at best a temporary measure; beneficial for short-term stability, but not a universal solution for the conflict.

Decentralisation

If the centralised Palestinian nationalist project has failed, what is the alternative? There is only one option: decentralise the Palestinian polity itself. In practical terms, this means a “balkanised” West Bank and Gaza; not in the negative sense of chaotic fragmentation, but as empowered local governance in disconnected areas, rather than one single, monolithic Palestinian state. The idea might sound radical, but it is actually more attuned to Middle Eastern realities than the imported Western notion of a unitary nation-state.

As the esteemed Jonathan Sacerdoti reports, Mordechai Kedar has long advocated for an “eight emirates” plan, noting that Palestinian society is deeply clannish and inherently fragmented, much like other Arab societies where strong tribal or local identities often override artificial national borders. In this concept, major population centres (Hebron, Nablus, Ramallah, Jericho, Gaza City, etc.) would each operate as city-state entities, governed by their dominant local clans or power structures. These could be mini-emirates or autonomous cantons, similar to the emirates of the UAE (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and others), which flourish under a federal framework but retain significant local sovereignty. The rural villages and smaller towns situated between these cities might remain under Israeli security control or eventually align with one of the city-states. Most importantly, each emirate would directly engage with Israel (and international partners) for its security and economic needs, bypassing the dysfunctional PA/PLO bureaucracy that has so far claimed to speak for all Palestinians.

What was, until recently, a theoretical thought experiment is now edging closer to reality. In Hebron, the West Bank’s largest city and a long-standing stronghold of clan-based society, a remarkable development has recently occurred. A coalition of influential Hebronite clans, led by Sheikh Wadee’ al-Jaabari, publicly declared their intention to break away from the Palestinian Authority and establish an autonomous Emirate of Hebron. Even more astonishing, in their letter to the Israeli government (specifically to Economy Minister Nir Barkat), these traditional leaders recognised Israel as the legitimate Jewish state and explicitly rejected decades of Palestinian rejectionism.

Sheikh Wadee’ al-Jaabari in Jerusalem, 3 July 2025

They signalled that Hebron wishes to join the Abraham Accords in pursuit of peace and development for their people. This is a direct repudiation of the PLO’s national project and a bold bid for a different future. The fact that such a declaration came from within Palestinian society, not from external pressure, is game-changing. It suggests that at least some influential Palestinians have concluded that the PA’s path (endless conflict and international handouts) is a dead end and that partnership with Israel and the Arab states offers a better horizon. This move marks an unprecedented rupture with the Palestinian national project as defined by the PLO, and a welcome shift towards realism.

This embryonic Emirate of Hebron did not emerge in a vacuum. It was driven by behind-the-scenes efforts from figures like Kedar and supported by Israeli officials who see potential in local peace agreements. Nir Barkat has himself called for a “Palestinian chapter of the Abraham Accords,” imagining that one day Arabs in the West Bank will say “enough” to the PA and choose to join the regional peace process. He said, “If they work with Israel, we’ll help them build Dubai. If they fight Israel, they’ll end up looking like Gaza.”

This offers Palestinian communities a choice: prosperity through cooperation or devastation through resistance. The Hebron clans chose prosperity. Their initiative is likely the start; reports indicate that other regions might follow suit. Envision Nablus forging its own agreement with Israel and Jordan, or Gaza City governed by local leaders who agree to demilitarise in exchange for a significant reconstruction deal. We could witness a division of the Palestinian Authority into multiple centres of governance. That would be a positive development.

The end goal of a decentralised approach would be a collection of small Palestinian entities, each establishing peace with Israel and integrating into the regional economic framework. Instead of a single Palestinian flag flying over all of East Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Gaza (a scenario that is increasingly unlikely), we might see multiple flags: Hebron’s emirate, a Gaza coastal entity, a Jericho enclave (possibly confederated with Jordan), a Ramallah-based canton, and others, each aligning with Israel and its Arab peace partners.

These micro-states or autonomies could then collectively form part of an expanded Abraham Accords family. They would receive recognition, investment, and security guarantees from the US, Israel, and Arab countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. In return, they would each recognise Israel, renounce violence, and agree to demilitarisation (since Israel will not accept a patchwork of armed mini-Hamas).

One could even imagine a federation of these Palestinian entities among themselves. For instance, a council of emirs or local governors who coordinate on issues of common concern (trade, infrastructure, inter-city roads), perhaps with a rotating leader. Such a federation might symbolically satisfy the Palestinian desire for unity, even as practical governance remains localised. It is fundamentally a bottom-up state-building approach, rather than the failed top-down approach.

Importantly, this model addresses a key flaw of the failed Oslo-era two-state approach: it rewards Palestinians who choose peace rather than those who pursue maximalist claims. In a two-state negotiation, the most inflexible positions often gain leverage (as we saw with Arafat’s intransigence). In a multi-party framework, if one city refuses to agree, it does not hold all the others hostage; it simply gets left behind. For example, if Nablus’s leaders refuse to abandon irredentism, Nablus might remain under Israeli military control while other cities advance and prosper. This creates a strong incentive for peer pressure and moderation within Palestinian society.

Of course, there are significant challenges and questions. Israel would need to carefully manage security boundaries between these autonomous zones and its own territory, similar to the current Areas A/B/C division, but more permanent. Freedom of movement for Palestinians between cantons would have to be negotiated, possibly with permit systems or special corridors. Jerusalem’s status remains a complex issue; perhaps the Arab neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem could form one of the city-based entities, connected to the others (this is speculative).

The refugee issue would require a creative solution, likely involving resettlement in these expanding autonomous areas with substantial international investment. Instead of a “right of return” to Israel, refugees could be granted a “right of home” in new housing projects in Gaza or the West Bank, financed by the Arab states that previously used their plight as a political tool. Happily, this will also bring an end to UNRWA’s toxic influence.

Diplomatically, promoting this idea will not be easy: it challenges the long-standing international consensus on a single Palestinian state. It undermines the substantial financial incentives within the current PA that enable its leaders to become billionaires. However, that consensus has resulted in only death, destruction, stalemate, and frustration. After the upheavals of the past two years, a new approach is urgently needed.

Conclusion

The strategic vision presented here intentionally extends beyond the traditional comfort zones of peace-making. It advocates for dismantling the existing power structures (Hamas’s tyranny in Gaza and the PLO’s corrupt monopoly in the West Bank) in favour of empowering ordinary people and their local leaders.

In Gaza, the plan is to turn the population against Hamas by depriving the militants of their resources and legitimacy: support the clans, re-route aid, expose Hamas’s abuses, and complete military operations with precision and determination.

In the West Bank, the aim is to finally dispel the illusion that all of Palestine can be “liberated” from Israel, replacing this idea with promoting pluralism and pragmatic local governance: allowing those willing to pursue peace and prosperity to do so, one town at a time if necessary. This approach offers many paths rather than a single route, and that is its strength. It does not rely solely on one vulnerable Palestinian leader or a grand summit (which, as history has shown, can end in catastrophic failure). Instead, it constructs peace gradually, community by community.

For Israel and its allies, implementing this strategy will demand patience, adaptability, and a readiness to question traditional wisdom. It involves taking some calculated risks, such as trusting certain local Palestinian actors who were previously marginalised, or permitting new political structures to develop. It also requires exercising restraint at critical moments: for example, avoiding short-term political optics (such as the desire to proclaim a ceasefire victory) that could compromise the long-term goal of neutralising extremist organisations.

The United States, under President Trump’s leadership, has a pivotal role to play. Washington can leverage its influence with Arab states and its financial resources to support these new local autonomies and ensure that humanitarian efforts succeed without enriching Hamas. It can also be a truth-teller in international forums, making clear that supporting Palestinian aspirations does not equal empowering Hamas or indulging intransigence at the UN.

The Abraham Accords network, spanning from the Gulf states to Morocco, should be expanded to include those Palestinian entities that demonstrate readiness for peace. Imagine a future where a Palestinian city’s representatives attend economic conferences in Dubai or cultural exchanges in Manama, alongside Israelis, as part of a growing “Abrahamic” family. That vision is far more hopeful than the endlessly postponed two-state conferences in European halls that lead nowhere.

Critics will argue that this all sounds like an “apartheid of mini-states” or a way to dodge the Palestinian demand for full statehood. But one must ask: what has the insistence on a maximalist statehood (encompassing all Palestinians at once) achieved for the Palestinian people? Nothing but power struggles and misery.

Perhaps statehood will indeed materialise, but it might arrive through the back door, via a federation of emirates that eventually merge into a de facto nation. This is not without precedent; history provides examples of gradual state formation from smaller units (the United Arab Emirates itself was created when seven emirates united, yet each retained its local ruler and identity). The crucial point is that any future Palestinian entity or entities emerge in peaceful coexistence with Israel, not in opposition to it. Peace is not merely the absence of conflict but the presence of cooperation. When Gaza’s children can attend schools not run by Hamas indoctrinators, when Hebron’s markets are busy with goods moving freely to Israel and Jordan, and when a council of Palestinian mayors convenes in Abu Dhabi to attract investments, these will be the signs that the strategy is working.

In the final analysis, the conflict between Israel and “Palestine” has always been asymmetric, not just in power but also in vision. Israel built a thriving state, while Palestinian leaders focused on dismantling it. To genuinely resolve the conflict, that destructive vision must be defeated and replaced with a constructive one. Gaza’s liberation from Hamas and the West Bank’s progress beyond the old PLO leadership are two fronts in the same fight for a different future. The roadmap outlined here is admittedly ambitious and full of uncertainties.

However, clinging to the old plan and hoping that more negotiations will suddenly bridge an ideological divide is the very definition of insanity. It is time to adopt a new approach, one that relies on what works (local legitimacy, economic incentives, regional cooperation) and rejects what does not (foreign occupation models and grand summit talks disconnected from local realities).

By distinguishing the people from extremists and prioritising Palestinian well-being over the cult of Palestinian nationalism, Israel and its allies can help foster a post-conflict Middle East where today’s enemies become, if not friends, neighbours who agree to coexist peacefully. Ultimately, that is the peace worth striving for.

The next, final post in this series will propose a broader regional and international solution in response to the likely next moves of Israel’s global adversaries. Subscribe so you do not miss it!