Iran: hit hard, but not broken

The next move is to shatter cohesion and will to fight

As ever, I will keep my Iran analysis free to all. I am grateful to everyone who has shared it, and for the support that has boosted me into Substack’s World Politics bestseller list. This is a lengthy piece, and I appreciate you taking the time to share it. I wouldn’t have a platform without your support.

Deep breath. It has been a crazy 24 hours. The online jubilation has been a pleasure to see, as has the hard-coping of Iran’s online boosters. However, I would be an irresponsible analyst if I did not signal a note of caution amidst the celebrations. The job is far from over.

Last night’s US strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites did not occur without warning. They represented the climactic chapter of a 70-day saga of pressure and provocation. Over the past two months, Tehran had numerous opportunities to avert this outcome but declined them all. Early in the crisis, Washington signalled its willingness for direct talks. President Trump even explored a backchannel meeting in Istanbul, reportedly prepared to send envoys or even attend himself. That effort collapsed when Iran’s Supreme Leader, fearing an Israeli assassination plot, could not be reached to authorise negotiations.

Simultaneously, the E3+EU (Britain, France, Germany and the EU High Commissioner) launched their own diplomatic initiative. European foreign ministers convened with Iran’s envoy, Abbas Araghchi, in Geneva, emphasising their belief in de-escalation and the need for dialogue. French President Emmanuel Macron presented a surprisingly broad offer: zero uranium enrichment, limitations on ballistic missiles, and an end to funding armed proxies, in exchange for the cessation of hostilities. Europe’s message was clear: prioritise a return to substantial negotiations. Tehran’s response continued to be defiant. Araghchi insisted that Iran would not resume US-Iran talks in person until Israel ends its strikes, effectively stonewalling the outreach. Even as British and French diplomats urged Iran to negotiate without waiting for the cessation of strikes, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s regime stood firm: no talks until the “aggression” stopped.

The final offramp was starker: Trump’s call for Iran’s unconditional surrender of its nuclear ambitions. With Israeli airstrikes hammering Iran and US forces assembling, Washington issued an ultimatum demanding total surrender. Diplomatically isolated and convinced of American unreliability, Tehran chose resistance over surrender. It gambled that escalating pressure was a bluff or that its counter-leverage could forestall direct US intervention. That gamble failed. On the 70th day, American warplanes went in.

From pressure to pulverisation

In a concise national address, President Trump called the operation a “spectacular military success,” announcing that Iran’s key enrichment facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan had been obliterated. B-2 stealth bombers and volleys of Tomahawk cruise missiles executed these strikes, strictly confined to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Notably, no regime leadership bunkers or civilian population centres were targeted. The operation was calibrated to decapitate Iran’s nuclear capability without initiating full-scale war or regime change.

From a military standpoint, the operation was impressively executed. By coordinating with Israel, which had already spent nine days systematically dismantling Iran’s air defences, missile batteries, and all the rest of the extensive target set, the US strike faced no interference. B-2 bombers delivered Massive Ordnance Penetrators with pinpoint timing, burrowing into Fordow’s mountainside vaults before detonating in enormous subterranean blasts.

Simultaneously, US Navy submarines offshore unleashed dozens of cruise missiles at ancillary nuclear facilities. Importantly, even though these were strikes on nuclear sites, reports indicate no radioactive contamination escaped, which can only be a testament to the care in target selection and perhaps sheer luck. By all accounts, Iran’s enrichment programme has been dealt a severe blow. A senior Israeli official claimed that Iran’s nuclear timeline “has been set back by years,” and today’s US official statements suggest that all three sites sustained significant damage.

However, less than 24 hours after the last bunker-buster fell, it is evident that Iran’s regime is bloodied but unbowed. In the immediate aftermath, Tehran scrambled to project an image of resilience. The Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation rushed to assure the public that despite “the evil conspiracies of its enemies… [Iran] will not allow the path of development of this national industry to be stopped.” In practical terms, this means the regime claims it can rebuild and continue its nuclear programme, sanctions and airstrikes notwithstanding.

A senior Revolutionary Guard official even boasted that Iran “preventively transferred all the enriched uranium to hidden locations” in anticipation of attacks. According to this narrative, secret stockpiles of 60%-enriched uranium and undisclosed centrifuge cascades will enable Iran to resume its march to the nuclear threshold as soon as the dust settles. It is a classic face-saving claim; part bluff, part plausible countermeasure. This rhetoric is designed to convince both domestic and international audiences that the nuclear project remains viable. True or not, the effect is to signal that Iran’s strategic will to obtain a nuclear deterrent is intact, even if its infrastructure is temporarily knocked down.

On the military front, Iran wasted no time in retaliating. Within hours of the US strikes, Tehran unleashed three small waves of ballistic missile and drone attacks against Israel. The first came in the pre-dawn darkness: around 22 medium-range ballistic missiles arced out of Iran towards Israeli cities, followed shortly by a second salvo of five more. Air raid sirens wailed from Haifa to Tel Aviv as Israel’s missile interceptors lit up the sky. Despite Israel’s multi-layered missile defences, some leakers got through.

Later, a third wave was fired, reportedly a mix of cruise missiles and long-range drones. Israeli authorities report at least 10 casualties so far from these retaliatory strikes, and damage at several sites. Though costly for Iran in terms of expended munitions, these counterattacks served their performative purpose, designed to allow the regime, even under heavy duress, to claim that it could still draw blood. Television images of missiles over Tel Aviv and smoke rising from Israeli cities are being trumpeted in Tehran as evidence that “the enemy’s crimes will not go unpunished.”

Of course, Iran has practically achieved nothing in the face of a brutal American body blow. Still, for all the Israeli-American operational success, it bears emphasising: the job is not done. The US and Israel have achieved a primary military objective in crippling Iran’s known nuclear facilities, but that objective was merely a means to a larger end. War, as Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote, is “an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will.” The central question now is: what is the enemy’s will, and has it been bent or broken? In other words, what political outcome are we seeking to compel, and are these strikes sufficient to achieve it?

The limits of bombing a nuclear programme

It is crucial to understand the nature of what was struck. Fordow is not a nuclear reactor; it is an enrichment facility. Destroying it does not erase Iran’s atomic knowledge. The Iranian programme is endogenous. Eventually, it can replace scientists, materials, and production lines over time. In an otherwise overly pessimistic assessment on X, Iyad El-Baghdadi nevertheless made a good point: it is “like trying to bomb a country that grows wheat out of knowing how to bake bread”.

Iran’s programme is decentralised and reproducible. Enrichment sites can be reconstructed in months, not years. Secret sites almost certainly exist. As noted, Fordow was not the base of the programme; it was an important “bakery,” not the entire industry.

Strategic intent: containment or collapse?

The United States and Israel may have shared the same target set, but they do not share the same strategic endgame. For the Trump administration, the strikes were a show of strength intended to compel Tehran back to the negotiating table. In the immediate aftermath, Trump said, “Now’s the time to negotiate.” His administration has repeatedly made clear, even today, that the US is not pursuing regime change.

Israel’s objective is more absolute. It seeks to ensure that Iran is not only denied a bomb but also the ability ever to construct one. For Israel, a delay is insufficient; it desires a transformation. This implies the destruction of the Islamic Republic itself, which appears to be an ambition that the US does not support at present.

This divergence is significant. If Iran consents to new negotiations and ceases enrichment, it may appease Washington. However, Israel might perceive any de-escalation as a loss of leverage. This discrepancy heightens the potential for future tensions among allies.

The regional picture

The airstrikes triggered a regional scramble. Oil markets surged. Tankers fled the Gulf. Flights were rerouted around Doha and Dubai. The Strait of Hormuz has the potential to become a flashpoint due to its critical role as an energy chokepoint. Iranian chatter suggests Tehran may selectively close it, blocking oil destined for Europe while allowing others to pass. If true, that is a calibrated signal.

Meanwhile, the Houthis may have ended their de-escalation deal with the USA. Red Sea attacks could resume, targeting Gulf ports and commercial shipping. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria are also preparing. This is a multi-front war in waiting.

This stage of the conflict is precisely where strategic theory transcends mere academia and becomes a guide to action. As previously noted, in Clausewitzian terms, war’s object is to compel the enemy to do our will. The use of force is not an end in itself, but rather a means to bend the adversary’s will to fulfil our political objectives.

What is the will being imposed here by the US and its partners? Simply put, it is the will that Iran shall not possess a nuclear weapons capability, now or in the future. Israel and the USA seek to compel Tehran to accept, at a minimum, the permanent dismantlement of any ambitions for a nuclear weapons programme (and arguably to cease regional aggression as well). This was the essence of Trump’s ultimatum that “Iran… must now make peace” and abandon its nuclear threat, or face annihilation. The White House is saying: you will renounce your nuclear programme and aggressive behaviour; you will submit to our preferred strategic terms. The military strikes represent one violent conversation in that broader coercive dialogue.

Clausewitz and the Manoeuvrist Approach

From a manoeuvrist approach perspective, the key to victory lies in breaking the enemy’s cohesion and will to fight, rather than merely grinding down their forces in attritional battles. The manoeuvrist philosophy emphasises using speed, surprise, and concentrated strikes against critical vulnerabilities (physical or psychological) to shatter the adversary’s overall cohesion. It involves attacking the enemy’s plan, morale, and sense of control, as much as their materiel. Forces employ violence and non-violent means “to break apart an opponent’s cohesion or shatter his will.” If we apply this lens to the current conflict, how does Iran measure up in terms of cohesion and will?

Thus far, Iran’s determination to resist remains strong. There is no indication that the Supreme Leader or the IRGC are contemplating capitulation; on the contrary, all signals from Tehran suggest a deliberate decision to absorb punishment and continue the struggle. The Iranian regime’s narrative that “we have secret uranium stocks, we will rebuild, we are retaliating against our enemies” is designed to maintain domestic resolve and international posture. It indicates they are not psychologically broken. As one indicator, consider Iran’s readiness to widen the conflict even after suffering heavy blows: threatening to target US bases and Gulf oil shipping, encouraging proxy forces like the Houthis to strike American assets, and continuing missile launches despite the risk of further US response. These actions demonstrate that the regime is still very much determined to fight on.

What about cohesion? Cohesion can be assessed at multiple levels. For example, the unity of the leadership, the reliability of the armed forces, and the bond between the regime and the population. At the leadership level, Iran demonstrates cohesion in crisis: there have been no apparent decisive splits in the ruling circles since the war began. The IRGC, clerical and political leadership are aligned in strategy. Even after Israel’s initial strikes decapitated a raft of military leaders, the system proved resilient. Successors stepped in, and command continuity was maintained. At the military level, units are following orders and fighting back; Iran’s missile forces have played their role over the past week of escalation. Notably, moral cohesion, or the shared will and sense of purpose, seems to remain high, if only through force. Basij militias are on the streets, setting up checkpoints to brutally deter any attempt to gather a mass of protest against the regime.

From a manoeuvrist perspective, these strikes have not yet achieved the desired strategic effect of shattering Iran’s will or cohesion. While last night the US delivered a massive shock to their system, disrupted their plans and degraded their capabilities, they have not yet broken Iran’s centre of gravity regarding their will to fight. These strikes have not yet cracked the Supreme Leader’s authority, the IRGC’s loyalty, and created a critical mass of Iranian protestors. Clausewitz reminds us that an enemy’s resistance results from two factors: the total means at their disposal and the strength of their will. Iran’s means have been reduced (nuclear means especially), yet its will, thus far, remains extant.

So, what would I recommend? Here are tactical paths forward and strategy recommendations to shatter the regime’s cohesion and will to fight:

Tactical options

With Iran’s nuclear program only disrupted, not dismantled, what next? Many tactical options remain on the table:

1. Expanded military strikes. Broaden the target set to include IRGC bases, missile factories, and oil export infrastructure. This risks escalation but would hit at regime pillars.

2. Cyber and Electronic Warfare. Blind and deafen Iran’s command networks. Jam communications, disable military comms, and disrupt propaganda.

3. Economic strangulation. Enforce a maritime exclusion zone, block arms and technology imports. Consider a full blockade if Iran escalates.

4. Target IRGC assets. Eliminate revenue streams and strategic enforcers with airstrikes on IRGC-run businesses, ports, and leadership compounds.

5. Covert operations. Sabotage facilities, support dissident groups, and undermine morale. They are difficult to measure, slow to implement, but effective when used together.

Strategy recommendations

1. Undermine regime credibility. Broadcast evidence of failure and amplify internal dissent.

2. Offer a diplomatic off-ramp. Iran must believe it has something to gain by surrendering the programme. Sanctions relief, guarantees of no regime change, and humanitarian aid could be part of the package to win Iranian agreement not to continue their nuclear ambitions.

3. Fortify the coalition. Maintain strong alliances by reassuring and protecting Gulf states. Deter proxy actors like Hezbollah and engage with China and Russia to prevent back-channel support for Tehran.

4. Prepare for post-conflict stability. If Iran’s regime cracks, ensure nuclear materials are secured. Support civil institutions to avoid a power vacuum.

Conclusion

Analysing these options, it is evident that none is a silver bullet on its own. A combination will likely be necessary: relentless military pressure to keep the regime on its toes, economic strangulation to weaken its foundation, covert actions to erode from within, and diplomatic initiatives to shape the end-state conditions. The goal is cumulative attrition of the will: a coordinated campaign attacking Iran’s physical capabilities, strategic calculations, and morale simultaneously. It aligns with the concept of integrated campaigning, which involves utilising all available instruments of power to achieve the desired strategic effect.

Will such a campaign succeed in preventing Iran from restarting its nuclear programme or escalating further? The good news is that Iran’s ability actually to build a nuclear weapon in the near term has been significantly delayed. US intelligence reportedly estimated Iran was days away from a crude device. Now, with Fordow and Natanz in ruins, any rush to a bomb is even more distant. It is now likely to be years off, especially if any hidden stockpiles (if they exist) remain under pressure. So militarily, time has been secured. To make that count, the coalition must use this time to drive home the political endgame.

The unfortunate news is that a cornered adversary can be extremely dangerous. If Iran’s will is not broken but instead strengthened by these measures, we could witness an even more aggressive escalation. Iran could attempt a “Hail Mary” move. For example, suppose Iran genuinely has 60%-enriched uranium concealed. In that case, they might rush to weaponise one device in secret as a deterrent of last resort (though extremely risky and technically challenging under wartime conditions). Alternatively, they might escalate the conflict horizontally: drawing in proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon to open new fronts against Israel or encouraging Shi’a militias in Iraq to attack US troops. Indeed, Israeli intelligence is rightly monitoring Hezbollah closely, and Israel has warned that the militia not to intervene. We must be prepared that breaking Iran’s will could require enduring a storm of intensified conflict in the short term.

The manoeuvrist approach would advocate identifying critical vulnerabilities in Iran’s psychological architecture of war. Where is Iran’s cohesion weakest? Possibly in the disconnect between a regime fighting for its ideological goals and a youthful population weary of isolation, oppression and economic hardship. If we can exploit that divide by amplifying popular discontent, the regime’s resolve could crumble. Where is Iran’s will to fight most vulnerable? Perhaps in the realisation that prolonged conflict genuinely jeopardises regime survival. That entails making the threat of increased force credible while simultaneously offering an exit strategy.

Looking historically, coercive campaigns have had mixed success. NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999 broke Milosevic’s will after 78 days, but only when he realised Russia would not bail him out and a ground invasion loomed. In the Second World War, Japan’s will was finally broken not only by the atomic bombs but also by the Soviet declaration of war: a one-two punch that removed both hope and capacity to resist. In 1991, Saddam Hussein’s will to fight for Kuwait collapsed when his army was routed and the world united against him; yet in 2003, the same Saddam regime fought to its bitter end because it perceived no alternative (and indeed was toppled). The lesson is that the enemy must feel both unable to continue and able to survive by yielding.

Currently, Iran’s regime still believes it can persist (hence the missiles flying) and feels it cannot survive if it surrenders (which explains its reluctance to consider unconditional terms). The objective now must be to alter those perceptions. Militarily, Israel and the USA must demonstrate that the regime cannot win or endure; politically, they must show that Iran can have a life after defeat. Even whilst I have been writing this piece, US Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, has said, “This mission was not and has not been about regime change”.

The strikes were militarily impressive and tactically successful. Iran’s known enrichment facilities have been diminished. However, the political goal of compelling Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions likely remains unmet, for now.

Iran’s regime continues to endure. Its ideology, institutions, and intent remain unchanged. The enrichment programme is badly damaged but still operational. The regime believes it can weather this crisis. The US and its allies must now dispel that belief.

War, as Clausewitz reminds us, is not merely about destruction for its own sake. It is about compelling the enemy to accept your political will. Until that occurs, the mission remains incomplete. The job is not finished; however, it is progressing well.