The future of the Middle East - Part Four

A regional strategic roadmap to counter adversaries and secure lasting stability

The final instalment offers a strategic roadmap for long-term peace. Drawing on over 14,000 words of analysis, it outlines what Israel, the US, and Gulf States can do to defeat asymmetric threats, restore legitimacy, support Palestinian governance, and secure a stable Middle East. This piece was even more extensive than it currently is, so I have used bullet points where possible. If you’ve found this work valuable, consider subscribing to support more in-depth reporting and analysis like this.

Introduction

As discussed in Parts One and Two, Israel’s military victories over Hamas and Hezbollah have shifted the balance of power in the Middle East but have not eliminated the threats. Adversaries are adapting with asymmetric tactics from insurgency and proxy warfare to disinformation and “lawfare”, aiming to undermine Israel and its allies in non-conventional ways. Part Three examined an option for resolving the Palestinian issue. Meanwhile, Israel faces diminishing international support, especially among younger Western and Global South audiences, due to the humanitarian fallout of recent conflicts.

In this context, Israel, the United States, and their Gulf partners must formulate a comprehensive, forward-looking strategy that integrates military resolve with diplomatic, informational, economic, and soft power initiatives. What follows is a strategic outline that addresses near-term imperatives and long-term objectives for achieving sustainable peace and security across the remainder of the Middle East.

This four-work piece does not claim to have all the answers. There will be political, diplomatic, economic and military roadblocks with any suggested solution—but if we do not try and find new ideas, we will be back to the same old failed pathways.

Guiding Principles and Strategic Objectives

• Integrated multidimensional approach. Coordinate military, diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts into a single cohesive strategy. Tactical successes must be paired with political and narrative gains, recognising that sustainable peace requires not just deterrence but legitimacy. Israel and its allies together should combine hard power with soft power to counter enemies on all fronts.

• Adaptability and bipartisan support. Design the strategy to withstand shifts in US leadership. This involves securing broad bipartisan consensus in Washington on key elements (such as confronting Iran’s threats, supporting Israel’s security, and pursuing regional peace) so that policy remains stable under any administration. For instance, emphasising shared goals like combating terrorism and preventing Iranian nuclear proliferation can sustain support across party lines. Institutionalise cooperation (through formal agreements, joint working groups, and defence partnerships) to outlast any single government.

• Prevention of overreach. Guard against tactical overconfidence that could alienate allies or global opinion. Every military action should be weighed against diplomatic costs. Restraint, adherence to international law, and proactive transparency about operations will help prevent adversaries from gaining propaganda victories. Israel must uphold the moral high ground through accountability and humanitarian care, aligning its actions with Israel’s own values and those of its Western and regional partners.

• Unity of effort. Establish mechanisms, such as a joint strategic planning cell or regular high-level consultations, to align the policies of Israel, the US, and key Arab partners. A united front is essential to isolate and deter adversaries. Clear communication and burden-sharing will ensure no single actor is overextended and that responses are coordinated.

Strengthening Security and Military Posture

Deterring Hamas, Hezbollah and other proxies across the region

Iran’s proxies have been severely weakened by this war, losing much of their arsenals and leadership. In the short term, they are consolidating and are unlikely to initiate conflict; however, at some future point (possibly after a change in the US President), Iran may once again activate its proxies and allied militias. To deter this, Israel and its allies should:

• Enhance global counter-terror intelligence sharing (Mossad, CIA, Gulf intel) to disrupt plots beyond Israel’s borders. Iran’s IRGC or Hezbollah may attempt terror attacks on Israeli or Jewish targets abroad as retaliation. A joint counter-terror task force should monitor and thwart such plots, and coordinate with security services from Europe, Asia, and Africa to arrest operatives before they strike.

• Maintain strong deterrence along Israel’s border. Continue Israeli intelligence overflights and precise strikes on rearmament efforts (such as intercepting Iranian arms shipments). Convey through discrete channels that any attempt to rebuild missile sites or cross-border attack capabilities will prompt swift action.

• Interdict Iran’s arms network. With Syria’s illicit supply route disrupted by Assad’s downfall, Iran may attempt risky covert smuggling to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon or by sea to destabilise these countries and support its proxy forces. Israel, the US, and regional navies (including perhaps Egypt or Cyprus) should enhance maritime and aerial surveillance to intercept illicit arms shipments. A collaborative naval patrol in the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean could target Iranian weapons headed for Gaza, the Houthis, or Hezbollah. Recent Houthi missile attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and their interception by US/UK warships highlight this need.

• Regional missile defence integration. Accelerate efforts to connect Israeli, Gulf Arab, and US air defence sensors into a regional missile shield against Iran and its proxies’ rockets and drones. The success of Israel (with US support) in shooting down hundreds of Iranian missiles and drones in the recent war demonstrates the value of integrated defences. Joint early-warning drills and information-sharing agreements (even if behind the scenes) will protect all partners. To encourage Gulf states’ participation, the US should reassure them they can expect the same level of defensive support if Iran attacks them directly, not just Israel. An effective shield will neutralise one of Iran’s key pressure tools and bolster confidence in the coalition’s security.

• Cyber Defence and Offence. Anticipate heightened Iranian cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, including water systems, power grids, and banks. The US and Israel already work closely on cyber defence; expanding this collaboration to Gulf partners through joint cyber training, real-time threat intelligence sharing, and strengthening financial and banking networks is essential. Develop offensive cyber capabilities to pre-emptively disrupt enemy command-and-control, for example, by disabling servers that coordinate militant rocket launches or IRGC drones. A unified cyber command task force could discreetly sabotage adversaries’ capabilities before they cause damage.

Preventing Iranian escalation and nuclear brinkmanship

Iran remains the linchpin of the adversarial axis, providing funding, weapons, and ideological backing to groups. With its proxies battered (as identified in Part One), Tehran might consider dramatic escalations over the medium- to long-term, including accelerating its nuclear program (possibly even withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue a bomb openly), hoping a nuclear deterrent would ensure regime survival. To counter this:

• The US and Israel must maintain a dual strategy: robust diplomacy and credible military options to prevent a nuclear Iran. Diplomatic efforts could include re-engaging Iran in negotiations, using its weakened strategic position after the conflict, while quietly preparing contingency plans for targeted strikes if Iran advances towards obtaining a weapon. The recent Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites during the “12-Day War” delayed Iran’s programme, likely by only 1-2 years. Partners should be prepared to act again if necessary, while managing the consequences through unified messaging, so that such action remains a last resort for global security.

• Expand security guarantees to Gulf states and Israel to deter Iranian adventurism. For instance, formalise understandings that any major Iranian attack on Gulf allies will provoke a response from the US and coalition forces. This deterrence, alongside regional missile defence, increases the repercussions for Iran and may discourage it from reckless military actions.

Maintain pressure on Iran’s proxy networks in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Assist the Iraqi government in dismantling Iran-supported militias; in Yemen, collaborate with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to contain the Houthi missile threat. By denying Iran alternative battlefronts, the coalition prevents Tehran from initiating new conflicts to compensate for its losses.

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visiting the Bushehr nuclear power plant in January 2015. Mohammad Berno/Iranian Presidency Office via AP

Diplomatic Initiative and Regional Partnerships

Expanding the Abraham Accords Coalition

Strengthen and expand the emerging alliance between Israel and Sunni Arab states, which acts as a diplomatic and security barrier against Iran and extremist non-state actors. From Israel’s perspective, enlarging the Abraham Accords diplomatically surrounds Iran and isolates its proxies. Key steps:

• Pursue Saudi-Israeli normalisation as a key objective. Saudi Arabia’s participation in the accords would be a “prize above all others” for Israel, opening the door to broader ties within the Muslim world. The US should continue mediating towards an agreement, recognising Riyadh’s conditions, likely including a viable path towards Palestinian statehood and tangible benefits for Palestinians as outlined in Part Three. Developing a framework that addresses Saudi security concerns (for example, defence agreements, and perhaps NATO-like guarantees) and includes a credible Palestinian component will enable a breakthrough. This not only brings the Gulf’s largest economy and religious leader into the pro-peace camp, but also supports moderate voices across the Islamic world (for instance, potentially encouraging countries like Oman, Qatar, or even Indonesia to move towards détente with Israel gradually).

• Establish a stronger regional security forum. Develop the Abraham Accords group into a more formal Middle East Security and Development Forum. Regular summits and working groups (including defence ministers, intelligence chiefs, and foreign ministers of Israel, UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, the US, etc) can coordinate policies on Iran, Syria, and counter-terrorism. For example, joint statements and unified diplomatic responses to Iranian aggression will present a united front. Intelligence-sharing arrangements can be strengthened under a multilateral framework to overcome hesitations in sharing sensitive data. Over time, this forum could even lead to a collective defence understanding against common threats, similar to a mini-NATO (while stopping short of a formal treaty if political barriers persist).

• Engage the Global South and the international community. Iran and its allies have aimed to diplomatically isolate Israel by rallying support from the Global South in forums like the UN. To counter this, Israel, the US, and Arab partners should initiate a diplomatic charm offensive across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This could involve increased development aid and technology partnerships (such as agricultural technology, water management from Israel and Gulf states to African nations); high-level visits and public diplomacy emphasising Israel’s contributions and commitment to a just peace; and coordinating voting strategies at the UN. Including Arab Muslim voices from the Gulf in pro-Israel advocacy can be a persuasive approach. When Muslim-majority states defend their ties with Israel as beneficial and urge others to reject Iran’s narrative, it weakens the perception of “Israel versus the Muslim world”.

• Defuse the backlash against normalisation. Acknowledge and manage the internal tensions that Arab partners face. Adversaries will try to exploit widespread sympathy for Palestinians to fracture the Israel-Arab rapprochement. To help partners withstand this pressure, Israel and the US should permit and understand certain balancing acts: for instance, Gulf states may issue symbolic criticisms of Israeli military actions or provide humanitarian aid or reconstruction to Gaza as a release valve for public opinion. Rather than viewing this as a betrayal, Israel can tacitly coordinate these moves (such as advance notice of operations so partners can prepare public responses). At the same time, emphasise that normalisation is not a betrayal of Palestinians if it ultimately leads to better outcomes for them; a point to be reinforced by integrating Palestinian development into the Abraham Accords (see Part Three). When Iran or Hezbollah attempt to inflame outrage, say, by accusing Arab leaders of “selling out Jerusalem”, those governments can point to tangible benefits they are delivering to Palestinians and the dangers of Iran’s destructive interference.

• Prevent and respond to spoiler attacks. Historically, whenever diplomatic progress is imminent, rejectionist actors organise violent provocations to derail it. The coalition must anticipate and defend against such spoilers. For example, if Saudi-Israeli talks progress, Iran might mobilise the Houthis to attack Saudi oil facilities or encourage Hezbollah to threaten Gulf targets. Therefore, increase intelligence surveillance on Iranian proxy planning and strengthen defensive readiness (e.g., US naval and air deployments near Saudi Arabia) during sensitive negotiations. Develop joint contingency plans: if a terror attack or missile strike aims to sabotage a deal, all parties should respond in solidarity rather than withdraw. Publicly, Arab partners and the US should reaffirm their commitment to peace even amid violence, denying terrorists the strategic goal of sabotaging diplomacy. Quietly, swift retaliation on the responsible militia (while avoiding civilian harm) will signal that aggression only reinforces the resolve to cooperate. By strengthening the resilience of the peace process against shocks, the coalition can deny Iran, Hamas, or others their “spoiler” trump card.

  

  Tia Dufour / White House / Anadolu Agency / Getty

Information Strategy and Global Legitimacy

Maintaining the support of the international community, especially winning the narrative battle among younger generations, is as vital to Israel’s long-term security as any tank or missile. Adversaries are conducting an aggressive information war, spreading disinformation, leveraging sympathetic media, and taking Israel to court in global forums. To counter these efforts:

• Counter-disinformation operations. Iran and its allies flooded social media with fake accounts and manipulated content during the war, portraying Israel as a villain. Israel, the US, and tech-savvy partners (possibly from the private sector) must respond effectively in the digital sphere. This includes collaborating with major social media platforms to identify and remove bot networks and false propaganda. Intelligence units can reveal the sources of coordinated inauthentic behaviour—for instance, by publicising evidence of Iranian or Russian troll farms producing fake atrocity images. Swift fact-checking responses are essential: establish a joint communications task force that monitors online trends in real time and quickly debunks viral falsehoods with credible evidence. By flooding the zone with truth, including video proof of Hamas fighters using human shields or the reality of Israeli aid efforts, the coalition can dilute the impact of adversaries’ lies. Public diplomacy should also identify and name the state actors behind disinformation to shame those governments and make global audiences sceptical of their narratives.

• Engage youth and Global South audiences. The generational and geographic shift in perceptions of Israel must be met with a proactive hearts-and-minds campaign. Polls show that a majority of young Americans now view Israel unfavourably, including 50% of Republicans under 50 and 71% of Democrats under 50 holding negative views, which represents a dramatic increase in scepticism in recent years. In the Global South, many see the conflict through anti-colonial lenses. To address this, the coalition should reshape its narrative and outreach.

  • Emphasise shared values and empathy. Israel should openly acknowledge the suffering of Palestinian civilians and demonstrate its commitment to improving their future, not as propaganda, but as policy (for example, highlighting the field hospitals it has set up or its provision of aid). By showing compassion, Israel diminishes the image of an unfeeling Goliath.

  • Cultural diplomacy. Amplify voices that connect with younger audiences. This may involve encouraging Israeli and Arab peace advocates, artists, and social media influencers to work together on campaigns promoting coexistence. Content that humanises all sides and shares stories of cooperation can be more engaging than rigid government statements. For example, showcasing an Israeli medical team caring for Gazan children, or an Emirati and Israeli musician performing together, creates powerful positive images to counteract negativity.

  • Campus and diaspora engagement. Empower Jewish and Israeli students, as well as supportive Arab and Muslim voices, and their allies from all faiths and none to participate in dialogue on Western campuses and online platforms where opinions are formed. Provide increased resources and training for these young ambassadors to advocate for peace and reveal extremists’ atrocities convincingly. Meanwhile, listen to and incorporate legitimate human rights criticisms, showing that Israel and its allies are not dismissive of moral concerns.

  • Broadcast in local languages. Leverage the media expertise of partners like the UAE and Bahrain to create content in Arabic, French, Spanish, and other languages that challenges extremist propaganda. For example, engage popular Gulf news outlets or social media personalities to discuss the new regional peace dynamics and the threats posed by Iran’s interference. Qatar’s Al Jazeera has been a platform for anti-Israel messages; the coalition needs alternative outlets that reach the same audiences with fact-based narratives.

• Counter lawfare and restore legitimacy. Opponents have exploited international law and human rights forums to portray Israel as a rogue state, from ICC investigations against Israeli officials to UN resolutions condemning its occupation. To respond:

  • Proactive legal diplomacy. The United States and friendly nations should vigorously oppose one-sided initiatives in the UN and other organisations. This involves assembling a coalition of democracies and moderate states to vote down or amend biased resolutions, and to insist on recognising the context of terrorism faced by Israel. At the same time, Israel must address the substance of the allegations by conducting credible internal investigations into any misconduct that occurred during the conflict. By holding any offenders accountable, Israel can weaken the justification for external prosecutions. Showing transparency and restraint (as Israeli allies will quietly encourage) is essential.

  • Strategic public inquiries. Consider establishing an independent investigation with international observers into the Gaza war’s civilian toll and reconstruction needs. If Israel leads in honestly assessing the harm and charting remedies, it can take charge of the narrative rather than appearing defiant. A well-publicised effort to implement lessons learned (for example, improving precision targeting, better humanitarian coordination in military operations) would demonstrate to global audiences that Israel values human life and international norms.

  • Enhance humanitarian coordination by collaborating with selected and vetted NGOs to expedite aid delivery and reconstruction in conflict zones, such as Gaza and South Lebanon. By actively facilitating relief efforts and ensuring visibility in doing so, Israel can improve its international image. Notably, following the Gaza campaign, there is a global demand for a substantial humanitarian response. Collaborating with Arab states to provide relief offers dual benefits: alleviating suffering and showing that Israel is not obstructing aid. Such actions directly address the reputational harm caused by images of destruction and a global disinformation campaign.

  • Narrative of legality and ethics. The coalition’s spokespeople should consistently communicate the lawfulness and necessity of actions taken against groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Emphasise that Israel respects the laws of war and that militant opponents commit double war crimes by attacking civilians and hiding behind civilians. At the same time, avoid dismissing all criticism; acknowledge the tragedy of civilian losses and demonstrate a commitment to peace. A global PR campaign to reframe the conflict as “civilised nations versus terrorists” rather than “Israel versus Palestinians” can help regain moderate support. Over the next decade, as today’s youth become tomorrow’s leaders, these narrative battles will influence policy. The goal is that future Western leaders do not see Israel as a pariah, but as a democracy that strives to uphold shared values even amid complex security challenges.

Post-conflict reconstruction and counter-extremism

Every military campaign must be followed by a plan to maintain peace. Connecting reconstruction, governance, and counter-extremism is vital to stop defeated enemies from regrouping and to repair war damage. In Gaza, southern Lebanon, or any area scarred by conflict, the coalition should carry out comprehensive stabilisation programmes.

• Gaza reconstruction plan. After the active combat phase in Gaza, Israel and international partners (Gulf States, US, EU) should immediately lead a large-scale reconstruction effort. This would be a Marshall Plan-style project to rebuild homes, hospitals, water and power systems, and schools, clearly improving daily life. Importantly, this must be done without returning control to Hamas. One approach is a joint administration involving the PA, Egypt, and possibly a temporary international mandate to oversee Gaza’s civil affairs with armed support from the IDF. Gulf countries can contribute significant funds (they pledged billions in past reconstruction conferences) and technical expertise, gaining goodwill. Link this to a demilitarisation programme: militants can be offered amnesty and vocational training to encourage disarmament, while anyone attempting to rearm is detained. The message to Gazans: peace and good governance bring prosperity, violence only causes destruction. Over time, successful rebuilding under responsible governance will diminish the influence of extremists.

• Refugee camp rehabilitation. In the West Bank, focus on areas such as Jenin and Nablus, which have experienced heavy clashes. Decades-old refugee camps that have become hubs for militancy should be transformed through urban redevelopment. Replace the maze of alleys (where gunmen hide) with planned housing, pave roads, improve sanitation, and generate employment opportunities there. This not only removes militants’ safe havens but also addresses longstanding humanitarian concerns. Simultaneously, implement community policing and social programmes (with NGO support) in these districts, so young men are less likely to be drawn to armed violence. The militants killed or captured in recent operations have created a volatile social environment. Preventing cycles of revenge requires visible improvements in everyday security and opportunities for Palestinians in these areas.

• Reconstruction in Lebanon’s Shia areas. Hezbollah will attempt to leverage its own rebuilding efforts to strengthen its support base after the war in southern Lebanon. Either through the government or trusted NGOs, the US, EU, and Gulf states should preempt this by directing aid to Lebanon, aimed at rebuilding Shia villages without empowering Hezbollah. For example, condition aid on it being distributed by impartial entities, and support Lebanese civil society organisations to take the lead in reconstruction. If ordinary Lebanese perceive that hospitals are being rebuilt with Arab and international support, not solely through Hezbollah’s patronage, their reliance on Hezbollah may decrease. Over time, this could lead to political pressure within the Shia community for Hezbollah to moderate or disarm. It also counters Iran’s narrative by demonstrating that Arab neighbours (not Iran) are the true helpers in times of need.

• Counter-extremism education and messaging. Reconstruction is not solely physical; it also involves rebuilding minds and community resilience. The coalition should fund and promote educational initiatives that challenge extremist ideologies. In Gaza and West Bank schools, encourage updated curricula (perhaps under PA and international guidance) that emphasise peace, development, and critical thinking, rather than glorifying “resistance martyrdom.” Support youth programmes such as sports leagues, arts, and exchange activities that provide young Palestinians with positive outlets and opportunities for interaction with Israelis and others. Similarly, in Arab partner countries, continue to monitor and restrict extremist financing or preaching (for example, shut down any remaining charities acting as fronts for Hamas/PIJ funding. The Abraham Accord governments can enhance credibility by sponsoring clerics and scholars who promote tolerance to visit Palestinian areas or speak in the media, countering the religious justifications for violence used by groups like Hamas. By detoxifying the social environment that fosters militancy, these efforts help ensure that, once defeated, these groups do not easily regain their foothold.

• Align reconstruction with reconciliation. Use rebuilding processes also to promote dialogue. For example, involve mixed working teams of Israelis, Palestinians, and international experts in planning infrastructure, demonstrating cooperation in action. Encourage public meetings where local Palestinian leaders, Israeli officials, and donors discuss priorities transparently with the community. Such inclusive approaches can gradually rebuild trust at the grassroots level. Overcoming decades of hatred will not be quick, but seeing Israelis helping (instead of manning checkpoints) will change perceptions. Similarly, Israeli society should be exposed to these positive developments. For instance, inviting Israeli businesses to invest in Gaza industrial zones under secure conditions, fostering peace constituencies on both sides. Successful reconstruction, combined with good governance and anti-extremism benchmarks, can serve as a showcase that diminishes the arguments of militants who claim these efforts are deceitful. The coalition must be prepared to publicise success stories: each new school opened or farm irrigated in a post-conflict area is a blow to extremist credibility.

Restoring International Legitimacy and Soft Power

Israel’s ability to act decisively in its defence has always depended on a degree of international acceptance: the perception that it is on the “right side” of a moral struggle. Recent events have jeopardised this, with Israel depicted by enemies as a ruthless occupier or aggressor. It is crucial to restore Israel’s global reputation and address the damage caused by the Gaza war and other conflicts. This not only benefits Israel diplomatically but also counters a key strategic victory claimed by Iran and its allies: victory through resistance and survival. To reverse this trend:

• Accountability and transparency. Israel should continue not to shy away from investigating itself and its soldiers, but more importantly, show the outcomes of such investigations. Demonstrating that the IDF holds itself to high standards can change international attitudes. If mistakes were made, acknowledge them and outline corrective actions or punishments. This kind of accountability is rare in the Middle East and would bolster Israel’s image as a law-governed democracy. It also gives allies in Washington and Europe something to point to in Israel’s defence. The goal is to show that, unlike its adversaries, Israel does not wilfully target innocents and that any civilian suffering is a tragic byproduct of Hamas’s tactics and the fog of war—something Israel strives to minimise. Restraining rhetoric (avoiding triumphalism or dehumanising language about the enemy) and expressing sorrow for the loss of life, even while firmly blaming Hamas for initiating conflict, are small steps with a significant impact abroad.

• Diplomatic outreach and narrative reframing. After conflict, dispatch high-level envoys, such as respected former officials, military officers, or civic leaders, to key capitals, especially in Europe and the Global South, to engage with critics. Instead of adopting a defensive stance, these envoys should listen attentively to concerns and articulate Israel’s position in a calm, empathetic way (a huge challenge in the face of global disinformation about the war). They can showcase steps Israel is taking towards peace and invite these nations to join in reconstruction efforts. For example, inviting countries that were critical at the UN to participate in Gaza’s rebuilding process gives them a stake in stability and moderates their position. Additionally, shift the narrative from merely security to one of shared prosperity: highlight how a peaceful Middle East, enabled by the Abraham Accords, can benefit everyone through energy cooperation, technological exchange, climate change efforts, and more, and demonstrate that Israel is eager to be a constructive partner in that future. This positive, inclusive message will stand in contrast to the bleak, destructive vision propagated by Iran and extremist groups.

• Leverage the Abraham Accords in public relations. The very existence of new Arab-Israeli partnerships serves as a strong rebuttal to accusations that Israel is a racist pariah state. Israel and its allies should highlight stories of cooperation, such as Moroccan and Israeli doctors saving lives together, Emirati and Israeli astronauts working side by side, and Bahraini and Israeli entrepreneurs innovating, to show that Israel is positively integrating into the region. Public opinion in the West may become more sympathetic upon seeing Muslims and Jews collaborating instead of fighting. Additionally, when criticisms are raised in international forums, having Arab diplomats speak up for Israel or its right to defend itself (even subtly) can carry far more weight than Western voices alone. The coalition should encourage and possibly script these behind the scenes, unifying talking points that defending against terror benefits everyone and that Palestinians would gain more from peace than resistance. Over time, if the Abraham Accords continue to hold firm (as they did through the Gaza war, despite public protests), it undermines the “Israel vs Islam” narrative that Iran promotes.

• Invest in Soft Power initiatives. Israel and its partners should strengthen soft power through positive contributions on the global stage. Expanding foreign aid programmes (for example, Israeli agricultural training in Africa or Gulf-Israel joint medical missions in Asia) builds goodwill that yields diplomatic benefits when conflicts arise. Also consider hosting cultural and sporting events that include participants from Arab states and beyond, demonstrating a new era of coexistence. Overcoming the stigma in international cultural forums (like ensuring Israeli artists, academics, and athletes are not boycotted) is crucial. The more normal Israel appears, the harder it becomes for adversaries to demonise it. Simultaneously, continue to highlight Iran’s and its proxies’ abuses (like Iran’s crackdown on protesters, Hezbollah’s criminal activities, Hamas’s repression of Gazans) to underline the moral difference between the two sides. The aim is that in the court of global opinion, Israel is perceived as a nation striving for peace and development. In contrast, its enemies are viewed as perpetrators of violence and repression. Securing this narrative will ensure that when Israel next must act militarily, it will not stand alone and condemned, but instead supported or at least understood by the majority of international stakeholders.

Conclusion

This strategic roadmap envisions a future where military vigilance is complemented by diplomatic innovation, and where victories are not only measured in battles won but also in alliances strengthened and grievances addressed. By closely integrating military, diplomatic, informational, economic, and soft power tools, Israel, the United States, and their regional partners can stay ahead of adversaries’ tactics and deprive them of strategic advantages. The plan remains flexible across political cycles, building on fundamental security interests and shared values that transcend partisan shifts, thereby ensuring continuity of purpose.

The challenges are significant: insurgencies that must be suppressed without fostering new resentment; propaganda that must be countered with truth and transparency; and a Palestinian question that requires a fair response to truly resolve the conflict. However, within these challenges lie opportunities. The momentum of the Abraham Accords, if combined with a sincere effort to include Palestinian rights, can transform the Middle East landscape in favour of peace and cooperation. A stable Gaza and an empowered moderate Palestinian leadership would cut off the support that sustains Hamas and Hezbollah. A region united in trade and security from the Mediterranean to the Gulf will contain Iran’s ambitions and push it towards moderation; otherwise, it risks becoming irrelevant. An Israel that supports both deterrence and dignity will see its global standing restored, shielding it from diplomatic isolation.

This strategy focuses on shaping the environment where Israel’s enemies operate: making it hostile to terror, unwelcoming to incitement, and intolerant of lawless aggression. With unity, patience, and creative statecraft, Israel and its allies can ensure that those adversaries (Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran’s hardliners, and extremists) find no opportunity to exploit or sustain a narrative. Instead, they will confront a confident coalition that not only neutralises threats as they emerge but also presents a positive vision for a better future, leaving the enemies of peace on the wrong side of history. Through strength and wisdom, Israel can secure both its safety and legitimacy, ultimately winning the long-term strategic battle even as it secures victories on the battlefield.