The future of the Middle East - Part 2

The Abraham Accords, escalation risks, and Israel’s reputational crisis

Israel’s military victories might be hollow if it loses the battle for international legitimacy. This second long article of three explores how errors, disinformation, cultural backlash, and lawfare might threaten Israel’s standing even as the Abraham Accords expand.

The Abraham Accords Expansion

While Israel’s adversaries regroup militarily, a parallel battle is being fought on the diplomatic front—one that could significantly alter their strategic calculations. The Abraham Accords, initially signed in 2020, are gaining renewed momentum. To secure a diplomatic legacy, Donald Trump has been actively promoting an expansion of these normalisation agreements. Reports suggest that Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have been coordinating on a major deal to follow up the military operations.

According to an Israel Hayom report, they envision a swift end to the Gaza war and then a broad expansion of the Abraham Accords to include major players like Saudi Arabia and even Syria. The prospect of Syria normalising relations with Israel would have been dismissed as fantasy not long ago, but with Assad gone, a new Syrian leadership might be more receptive, especially with US backing (and financial motivation). Saudi Arabia, for its part, had already been moving towards a deal with Israel before the war (there were hints of progress in 2023 before Hamas’s attack disrupted it). Trump is now pushing to revive those talks, presumably sweetening the deal with security guarantees and other incentives for the Saudis.

Billboards in Tel Aviv read: "The 'Abraham Alliance.' It's time for a new Middle East," with images of Arab leaders, including Lebanese President Joseph Aoun. (Credit: @haningdr/X)

For Israel’s enemies, this diplomatic wave is highly concerning. Normalisation risks isolating Palestinian and Islamist movements, weakening the narrative that Arab and Muslim states will always oppose Israel. Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran have all criticised the Abraham Accords from the beginning. A senior Fatah official even claimed the accords were “one of the reasons” Hamas launched its massive attack on 7 October; essentially an attempt to derail the peace process by igniting war. Indeed, militants follow a spoiler’s playbook: when diplomatic progress is near, escalate violence to sabotage it. This was seen in the 1990s during the Oslo Peace Process, when Hamas and Islamic Jihad carried out suicide bombings to derail Israeli-PLO agreements. Now, with the expansion of the Abraham Accords, similar spoiler attempts are likely to follow.

For example, if Saudi-Israeli normalisation seems imminent, Iran or its proxies might stage an attack targeting Saudi interests, perhaps a missile strike on Riyadh from Yemen (Houthis) or sabotage of Saudi oil infrastructure to warn the kingdom that partnering with Israel has severe consequences. Likewise, Palestinian or Hezbollah militants could attempt a spectacular terrorist attack inside Israel or against Jewish targets worldwide, hoping a surge in violence would cause potential Arab allies to withdraw support for Israel.

The Abraham Accords pose an ideological challenge to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. These accords effectively marginalise the Palestinian issue in regional politics, at least at the state-to-state level. The militant camp will respond by attempting to keep the Palestine cause prominent. They will invoke pan-Arab and pan-Islamic sentiments, arguing that any Muslim who normalises relations with Israel is betraying Jerusalem and the Palestinian people. We have already witnessed public opinion backlash – for example, large protests in Bahrain, Jordan, and other places condemning Israel’s actions in Gaza and, by extension, their governments’ relations with Israel.

The governments involved in the Abraham Accords (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, etc.) managed the fallout of the Gaza war without withdrawing from the Accords. Still, they had to tread carefully: issuing condemnations of Israel’s bombardment to appease their populations while maintaining ties. Adversaries like Iran and Hezbollah will seek to widen that divide between the regimes and the people. They may covertly fund opposition groups or employ sympathetic clerics to denounce normalisation as religiously unacceptable. The Muslim world’s profound emotional connection with the Palestinian struggle remains a factor they will repeatedly exploit.

Another form of response is the development or strengthening of a counter-alliance. Iran has recently sought to improve relations with countries like China, Russia, and Turkey, presenting an “Eastern” or Islamic alternative to US-led coalitions. With the Abraham Accords effectively drawing Israel closer to several Sunni Arab states (and implicitly the US), Iran might intensify efforts through groups such as the “Axis of Resistance,” encouraging any country opposing Israel or Western dominance to cooperate.

We could see more overt strategic collaboration between Iran and organisations like the Taliban in Afghanistan or militant networks in Pakistan to disrupt US and allied interests, thereby increasing the cost of the US-brokered regional order. Iran will also focus on strengthening ties with the remaining rejectionist Arab actors: notably Iraq’s pro-Iran factions, Assad loyalists (if any persist), and perhaps Algeria (a country that has expressed opposition to normalisation). These initiatives aim to show that not everyone is aligning with Israel and that a unified front against Israel still exists.