The future of the Middle East – Part 1
The first in a trilogy of articles
This three-part series of long articles, spanning over 14,000 words of detailed analysis, examines how Israel’s adversaries are adjusting after military setbacks; how disinformation and international backlash threaten Israel’s global reputation; and what Israel, the US, and Gulf allies must do next to achieve lasting peace. From Hamas’s guerrilla tactics to Iran’s diplomatic manoeuvres, the reputational risks of the Gaza war, and the fragile promise of the Abraham Accords, this is my most comprehensive account yet of what is truly at stake. It merges military insight, diplomatic foresight, and narrative strategy into a clear roadmap for the region’s future. If you appreciate in-depth, strategic analysis on the most significant story in global affairs, please consider becoming a paid subscriber.
Part 1 – What Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran do next.
After catastrophic battlefield defeats, Israel’s enemies will aim to regroup. From Hamas’s insurgency in Gaza to Hezbollah’s battered prestige in Lebanon and Iran’s recalibrated ambitions, this first piece breaks down their likely next moves. It’s the product of months of research, laying the foundations for understanding what comes next in the Middle East.
Introduction
Israel’s recent string of tactical victories has left its traditional adversaries reeling from Khan Younis to Beirut to Tehran. Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, insurgent militants in the West Bank, and Iran itself have all faced setbacks on the battlefield. Meanwhile, momentum is mounting behind the Abraham Accords, with Donald Trump actively advocating for an expansion of Arab-Israeli normalisation. This combination of military successes and diplomatic efforts is reshaping the strategic landscape of the Middle East. How might Israel’s enemies respond? This analysis examines the military, diplomatic, ideological, and proxy warfare options these actors will consider, evaluating potential short-term reactions and long-term adjustments. The aim is to provide an accessible yet thorough overview of how the “Axis of Resistance” might adapt and what risks could arise for regional stability in doing so.
Hamas in Gaza
Hamas, badly battered by Israel’s campaign, has long shifted from conventional warfare to a prolonged insurgency. After months of fighting, US officials estimate Hamas has lost over three-quarters of its original fighting force, possibly down to a few thousand fighters, along with perhaps tens of thousands of untrained recruits, from a pre-war strength of up to 30-40,000. Numbers aside, this leaves Hamas militarily degraded but still with significant influence. With its tunnels, rocket arsenals, key leaders killed, and command posts mostly destroyed, Hamas is avoiding confrontations. Instead, it depends on hit-and-run ambushes, improvised explosives, and guerrilla tactics to harass Israeli forces. Fighters now lie in wait for Israeli units to deploy, then strike from the shadows.
This marks a significant shift from earlier in the war, when they engaged more directly and even set up pre-planned defensive positions that any conventional army would recognise. These asymmetric tactics could sustain a prolonged insurgency even after Hamas’s conventional defeat. Israeli officials acknowledge there is “no quick fix” to uproot every last fighter and tunnel; the realistic aim has been to dismantle Hamas as a governing authority rather than eliminate every militant. Essentially, Hamas is aiming for a protracted guerrilla war of attrition in Gaza’s rubble.
Militarily weakened, Hamas is doubling down on ideology and propaganda to maintain its cause. It paints survival itself as a form of victory, emphasising that despite devastating losses, the movement lives to fight another day. From the start of the war, Hamas’s fighters have been filming their small-scale attacks on Israeli troops and circulating edited videos on Telegram and social media to project an image of defiance and rally supporters’ morale. The narrative of “resistance” remains central. Hamas leaders insist that the struggle against Israel is ongoing, ordained by faith and nationalism, regardless of territorial losses.
Historically, after setbacks (for example, the aftermath of the Second Intifada in the 2000s), Palestinian factions have often claimed moral or symbolic victories to inspire future generations. We see echoes of this now: Hamas framing the 7 October 2023 onslaught as proof of Israeli vulnerability and exhorting Palestinians to remain steadfast, even as Gaza lies in ruins. The group is likely to invoke historic precedents (such as past Israeli withdrawals under pressure) to argue that continued resistance can eventually yield results, playing up the asymmetry of willpower. Israel can win battles, but Hamas seeks to win the long war of endurance.
With limited diplomatic channels, Hamas will also get little from its regional patrons and allies. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Lebanon’s Hezbollah have long supplied Hamas with arms and funding; in the wake of the defeat of both, these ties are now frayed, and Hamas looks increasingly isolated. We may see Hamas’s exiled leaders (in places like Doha or Beirut) lobbying for increased financial and military support or collaborating with other militant groups. Still, it is hard to see where these come from at the current moment.
In the West Bank, Hamas maintains underground networks and significant popularity; it might try to incite violence there as a proxy, encouraging allied militants to attack Israeli or even Palestinian Authority (PA) targets. Any such strategy, however, faces the reality of significant Israeli and PA security crackdowns (discussed below).
Hamas’s biggest current boon is the absence of a clear Israeli political strategy. Just this week, the IDF presented strategic options to the Cabinet. It is worrying that a clear political end state had not been decided before redeploying troops. This was the key flaw in Israeli planning for Operation Swords of Iron, and history seems to have repeated itself for Operation Gideon’s Chariots. Whilst operationally, the pressure is on Hamas through limiting their access to aid and seizing large areas of Gaza, politically, their continued governance in large areas and the presence of the hostages give them a chance of survival. Much will hinge on the eventual ceasefire agreement.
In the short term, Hamas’s political focus is likely on survival and maintaining relevance: avoiding destruction in Gaza, preserving its ideology, and perhaps returning to its roots as a social and political movement among Palestinians if governing Gaza no longer remains feasible. Long-term, if given the opportunity, Hamas will seek to rebuild its military strength (as it did between past conflicts), exploit its influence in the West Bank, and possibly develop new tactics like advanced drones or longer-range rockets to offset Israel’s countermeasures against its previous tunnel and rocket strategies.
The impact of Hamas’s information war against Israel and the West will be discussed in Part 2.
Hezbollah
Hezbollah has emerged from the latest clash with Israel considerably weakened both militarily and politically. Over a year of fighting (sparked when Hezbollah opened a northern front after Hamas’s attack) resulted in Israel wiping out large parts of Hezbollah’s arsenal and eliminating many of its top commanders and political leaders. Israeli forces carried out an intense three-month campaign in southern Lebanon that significantly diminished Hezbollah’s capabilities and even compelled the group to seek a ceasefire.