As promised, I am keeping my Iran commentary free to all. All I ask is that you share it.
The last few days have been a blur. Israelis are jubilant that their government have finally engaged the “head of the snake”. Bibi is keen on US help to finish Iran. The new proximity and readiness of US aircraft carriers and bombers suggest this is an option. As I have written here, from this point it goes one of three ways: a surrender deal, a deal without outright Iranian surrender, or American military action to help finish the job (if Israel does not finish it before that happens).
However, one overlooked aspect is that recent developments in the Gulf show the emergence of a deliberate and meticulously planned escalation strategy by the United States. It bears the unmistakable imprint of President Donald Trump’s diplomatic playbook. While operational control currently lies with Israel, the logic underpinning recent US behaviour is consistent with Trump’s characteristic approach to adversarial negotiations: apply maximal pressure, signal the worst-case scenario (military confrontation), and compel the adversary to concede to a favourable deal.
At the heart of this strategy lies the instrumentalisation of threat. We are seeing the credible threat of force, not just as a prelude to American military action, but as a means of manufacturing consent from the opposing party. In this instance, Iran is presented with a binary choice: capitulation in the form of a negotiated settlement, or the existential risk of regime collapse.
Let us review the pathway.

Phase One: calibrated threat and repositioning
The initial stage involved setting a 60-day window for negotiations, accompanied by the visible deployment of US bomber assets to Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The signalling was unambiguous: American patience is limited, and escalation is not off the table. However, the Iranian response was notably unreactive. The regime did not interpret the threat as credible, likely due to longstanding Trumpian and MAGA reluctance to engage in another Middle Eastern war, combined with perceived domestic political costs in Washington for another military intervention.
Phase Two: Israeli kinetic action
On the 61st day, Israel initiated direct military action. The timing is not coincidental: this is obviously the deal Bibi brokered with Trump. Although not officially coordinated, let us be honest with ourselves: without American approval, Israel would not have attacked. Israel’s move aligns with the broader US strategic objective of increasing pressure on Tehran. Israeli military action serves a dual function: inflicting real material costs on Iran and its proxies, while also reinforcing the perception that delay carries consequences.
Importantly, during this period, Donald Trump has continually advocated for a deal rather than conflict. This suggests that escalation (even Israeli military force) is being used as a bargaining tool rather than an end in itself.
Phase Three: escalated rhetoric and strategic positioning
In the last 24 to 48 hours, rhetoric has intensified with direct threats aimed at the highest levels of the Iranian regime, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and a call for “unconditional surrender”. Such explicit threats to the regime’s survival significantly shift the calculus. This is no longer about sanctions or containment; the message is that the regime’s future is at stake if they do not give Trump what he wants.
In parallel, the United States has continued to deploy military assets into the Gulf, reinforcing the perception of an imminent intervention. However, there is no conclusive indication yet of a commitment to full-scale war. Instead, the logic appears to be coercive diplomacy, applying enough pressure to force negotiations without actually committing American forces to action.
The next step is obvious: Iran surrenders and deals, or its leaders die.
Domestic political calculations
From Trump’s perspective, a negotiated surrender settlement with Iran that includes the surrender of enriched uranium stockpiles and an agreement to limit future nuclear development would constitute a major political triumph. It would allow him to position himself as the only American leader capable of both confronting and containing the Iranian regime while simultaneously avoiding another costly war.
This deal would enable Trump to triangulate among key constituencies: reassuring Iran hawks that he could succeed where previous administrations had faltered, and appealing to the isolationist America First wing by asserting that the US would avoid further foreign military entanglements. The actual content of the deal is secondary to the appearance of strength and success, which would not please Israel at all.
Iran’s strategic dilemma
For the Iranian leadership, the options are profoundly unattractive. Agreeing to a deal under duress, orchestrated in the shadow of Israeli military aggression and under direct American threat, would represent a significant humiliation. It would likely incur severe domestic political costs, not least because it would be perceived as capitulation to Zionist and Western pressure. Additionally, it would complicate Tehran’s broader strategic relationships, including ongoing nuclear cooperation with Russia.
However, the alternative is an escalating conflict without clear means of victory and overwhelming odds of defeat. This not only risks further economic collapse but also the potential unravelling of the regime itself. Internal discontent is already pronounced, driven by economic mismanagement, energy shortages, and growing public cynicism that has been brutally suppressed over the past years and months. The regime is now cornered, facing both international coercion and internal fragility.
Strategic implications for Israel
For Israel, a deal that permanently or even temporarily halts Iran’s nuclear development would fulfil its principal war aim. However, it would not tackle the broader challenge of Iran’s regional posture: its proxy networks, ideological ambitions, and asymmetric capabilities would remain intact. A weakened but unremoved Iranian regime could become even more reliant on non-conventional strategies to maintain regional influence. Here we see a misalignment between Jerusalem and Washington. Trump would prefer a deal; it seems clear that Bibi would prefer regime change.
It is crucial to emphasise that any outcome involving either intentional or accidental regime change in Iran carries substantial strategic risk. Historical precedents caution against assuming that such transitions inevitably lead to liberal democratic governance or regional stability. In the recent past, we have seen that they create power vacuums, intra-elite conflict, and a potential rise in extremist mobilisation. Given this perspective, regime collapse is not invariably a victory; it may signal the onset of a new and more unstable chapter. (As I have written about, here).
Conclusion
What we are witnessing in the Gulf is not a descent into inevitable American military involvement, but the execution of a highly transactional strategy rooted in coercive diplomacy. Trump’s approach of threatening maximum pain to achieve maximum leverage remains the animating logic. The goal is not regime change or military conquest, but a deal that can be sold domestically as a triumph of strength without entanglement.
Whether Iran will concede to such terms remains uncertain, and we may yet see American bombers in the air. What is clear, however, is that the stakes extend far beyond the nuclear issue. At play are questions of regional order, strategic credibility, and the future of power projection in the Middle East. The next move lies with Tehran, but the trap has been set. The art of the nuclear deal.
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If Sun Tzu believed that all issues could be resolved by a deal, he would have written a book called "The Art of the Deal".
War and a deal are two completely different qualitative states. You can try to combine them up to a certain point, and that point has already passed.
Trump positions himself as the king of deals, and claims that any goal can be achieved by a deal. Possibly. Possibly, provided that you are the smartest, you have all the good cards in your hands, and you know all the weak points of the enemy and are sure that this deal will be final. Oh, and this deal must also be fulfilled.
Even without going into details, it seems that Trump has only one or two conditions for confidence that a deal will solve problems.
Other than that. Hypothetically. We start a war to achieve a goal. Then, using military pressure, we offer a deal, and the enemy agrees to certain conditions. We stop the war, make a deal. Okay? - No.
The war is not over, because there is no victory for either side, and in a military sense, everyone considers himself a winner. The enemy does not automatically become a friend, he simply temporarily accepts the conditions under pressure. Therefore, he considers himself morally free outside the deal. And will try to achieve his goals. In fact, we have already seen many deals that did not stop anyone (Munich, the Nuclear Deal with Iran...), but I do not remember a single war that ended in victory for one side and did not stop the other side.
TACO?