Hamas: yes, but no

Israel remains in a strategic bind and Hamas has a plan for survival

Hamas has finally responded to Donald Trump’s 20-point plan to end the war in Gaza, and initially it appears conciliatory. The movement commends Arab, Islamic, and international mediators. It supports an immediate ceasefire and the entry of humanitarian aid. It indicates a willingness to negotiate a prisoner exchange and, in carefully selected language, approves of transferring Gaza’s daily administration to a Palestinian technocratic body supported by regional backing. It even expresses readiness to release all Israeli hostages, both living and deceased, under the exchange scheme within the proposal, while emphasising that the “field conditions” for such a transfer must first be met.

Remove the diplomatic veneer, and what is left is the same pattern we have observed in nearly every major round of talks with Hamas over the past two years. The organisation favours the elements it already prefers (aid corridors, prisoner exchanges, a nonpartisan municipal caretaker) while delaying the core demands that would genuinely alter the trajectory of the conflict. This exemplifies the “yes, but” approach: show flexibility on the margins and push the deal-breakers into the shadows of future discussions.

The statement itself clarifies that sequencing. Matters concerning the long-term political structure of Gaza and the broader issue of Palestinian rights, Hamas states, should be part of a “comprehensive Palestinian national framework.” In other words, the most critical decisions regarding power, security, and sovereignty should be deferred until a future intra-Palestinian process, in which Hamas fully anticipates having a voice and influence. As a strategic move, it is clever; as a response to the current plan, it is evasive.

Nowhere is that avoidance clearer than on the question of disarmament. The plan’s core is demilitarisation: verifiable steps to dismantle Hamas’s military infrastructure as the price of a ceasefire, phased Israeli withdrawals, and a transition to a more stable political order. On this, the statement is conspicuously silent. For Hamas, disarmament is not just a policy detail; it is a matter of existence, not least as clan violence and a post-war civil war are a distinct possibility. A direct acceptance would redefine the movement. Refusing to address the issue keeps the door open for a tactical pause while maintaining the group’s core capabilities. It also ensures that Jerusalem and Washington will interpret the response, not unreasonably, as a polite rejection, albeit one dressed in diplomatic language. This also brushes up against another issue with the 20-point plan: how do you guarantee a group like Hamas has disarmed in an area like Gaza, awash with weaponry?

The same ambiguity exists in Hamas’s discussion of governance. The movement states it “renews its approval to hand over the administration of the Gaza Strip to a Palestinian body of independents (technocrats) based on Palestinian national consensus and supported by Arab and Islamic backing.” Read carefully, that is a pledge to accept a caretaker for municipal duties, not a promise to exclude Hamas from the actual decision-making that shapes security and politics. The statement’s emphasis that the future of Gaza be decided within a comprehensive Palestinian framework indicates the opposite: Hamas intends to remain among those making decisions.

Even the hostage provision, invoked as proof of good faith, is also cautious. The group agrees with the exchange plan but conditions its implementation on the “field situation.” Meanwhile, messengers close to the talks suggest practical issues; most notably, that Hamas has, at times in recent weeks, lost contact with other factions believed to be holding some of the captives. This admission is significant. The proposal’s timeline for returning all hostages is intentionally tight, serving as pressure to secure early proof of compliance. If the movement cannot deliver every captive quickly, the clock will turn the promise into an early breach, and the entire sequence of prisoner releases and withdrawals that depend on it will come to a halt.

The 20-point plan’s non-negotiables were supposed to be obvious: weapons must be removed from the table, and Hamas must be out of government during the transition. Hamas’s statement addresses none of this. It welcomes the aid, the appearance of compromise, the technocratic facade of the deal, without accepting the core elements that make the deal meaningful. In that sense, the statement does not signify a turning point but rather a familiar stalemate: praise the mediators, accept the painless elements, avoid the crucial issues, and postpone the tough questions to a future forum that may never occur.

Meanwhile, the human stakes remain brutally real. Gaza’s civilians, already beaten down by bombardment, displacement, and the collapse of basic services, will carry the burden of another round of brinkmanship. Hamas’s choice to treat the territory as its last explosive belt makes sure that the cost of strategic ambiguity falls first and hardest on those with the least influence over the outcome. If the movement aims to safeguard its arsenal and political influence, and if Israel aims to prevent Hamas from rebuilding either, then each day without a clear plan for disarmament and governance brings the two sides closer to escalation instead of relief.

The uncomfortable truth is that the plan cannot operate without the elements Hamas left out. A ceasefire that is not linked to disarmament will be a pause, not genuine peace. A technocratic caretaker that does not isolate Hamas from control will merely be a disguise, not an actual transition. A hostage timetable that cannot be achieved because the captives are scattered across factions will serve as an excuse for blame, not a way to reduce tensions. The calculus is unforgiving and is built into the very structure of the proposal.

That is why today’s statement should be read with clear eyes. Hamas has accepted parts of the plan that reduce immediate pressure and improve its optics, while avoiding sections that threaten its survival as an armed group and its political role. Until the movement is willing to clearly state what it will do about its weapons and its claim to govern, the word “yes” in its statements will continue to serve as a softer-sounding “no.” For Gazans seeking a real way out, and for negotiators aiming for a deal that can hold, that remains the most sobering line in the text.