Haaretz: not telling the whole story

An alternative view to reporting from the Netzarim Corridor

I am sure you may have been as disturbed as I was to read the recent report in Haaretz about the conduct of the IDF in the Netzarim corridor in Gaza. For those who have not read it, the lurid allegations certainly raised my eyebrows. In later November 2024, I went to the Netzarim Corridor with the IDF. I saw nothing in the behaviour, conversation or ethos in the many soldiers I spoke to there that resembled the accounts described in Haaretz. This inspired me to do some digging of my own into accounts of serving in the Netzarim Corridor.

The corridor runs East to West from the Israel-Gaza border to the Mediterranean (see map below). It is designed to control movement between Gaza City and the South of Gaza. There are reports that checkpoints there are fitted with fiberoptic cable and facial recognition software to pick up Hamas and their allies attempting to move with civilians.

The area around this corridor is indeed flattened. As you cross the border fence from Israel into Gaza, it does not feel like a traditional entry into a kinetic war zone—it is more like entering the aftermath of a battle (which, of course, in some ways, it is). This is clearly not an area where fighting happens any more on a regular daily basis. Our escorts were more relaxed than on previous visits to the Philadelphi Corridor in July 2024. That said, I watched the vehicle in front with an experienced soldier’s eye, and I saw the level of professionalism I would expect. The top cover gunner was staying alert, rotating his machine gun barrel to the areas of likely threat I would expect, and the convoy drills were good.

I went to Gaza with Stefan Tompson from Visegrad24 and a cameraman. The visit was laid on just for us. After a ten minute drive, emphasising just how small Gaza is, we reached a base approximately midway along the corridor. It was an area of rear operations. Although in the distance we could hear operations in Nuseirat to our southwest, the base was behind large, built-up sand berms, festooned with stray dogs, and security felt relaxed. The soldiers had a Playstation, and one guy sat in a corner and strummed his guitar. Other troops were preparing a barbecue whilst their colleagues kicked around a football.

The soldiers were spoke to were all reservists from 252 Division, the reserve formation who were the focus of Haaretz’s hit piece. The atmosphere I observed was more relaxed than a British or American base would have been, but it was well maintained and free of litter and detritus. We met one of their commanders, who was intense and focused, but who spoke eloquently about their mission and the need to dismantle Hamas after 7th October.

As with all IDF commanders I have met, he was the opposite of vengeful against Palestinians. The IDF’s ethos and rules of engagement are always referenced early and often in every conversation with IDF front line officers. Many times now, I have observed the cold determination for the job in hand these men project. In some ways, it is more intriguing than if they were expressing rage or anger. I believe that the IDF does not care, on an institutional emotional level, about damage or death in Gaza—but to them it is very important to them to carry out such things legally. I find this whole approach appropriate. As a former soldier, I have no issue with it. War is bloody and brutal and requires controlled aggression. The blood and brutality are constrained by the law of armed conflict; but ultimately a soldier’s job is to carry out the mission within those parameters. And the mission for the IDF, after 7th October, is to conduct a war of national self-defence so that 7th October can never happen again. The ethos I have observed is the ethos I would expect.

The soldiers themselves were young reservists. They were endearing: their reception was warm towards us, they were curious about our cameras and why we were there, and they were keen to speak to us. We were amused that they were not expecting us: I have seen British Army stage-managed media visits, and this was not like that. A quick message was passed around the camp to trawl for soldiers who could speak English. Those troops we interviewed were eloquent, compassionate and thoughtful. Again, not a word of hatred was expressed for anyone but Hamas.

Nothing I had seen or heard in the Netzarim Corridor tallied with what I read in Haaretz. So, I reached out to contacts in the IDF. These were their thoughts.

Soldier One

The first soldier is an ex-commando who served with a friend of mine in the first months of the war. He then transferred to another unit and was posted to the Netzarim Corridor between March and August 2024 (under 99 Division). He was most recently deployed in Southern Lebanon.

He described his deployment to the Netzarim Corridor. His unit were posted in various fortified positions along the newly-cleared military road, which they were tasked with guarding. Their method was to repeatedly raid the areas immediately to the north and south of the corridor, to prevent Hamas from gaining a foothold there. Haaretz was correct: if anyone who looked like a potential combatant got close enough to pose a threat, the IDF troops shot to kill. This is exactly in line with the British or American rules of engagement I experienced in Afghanistan.

Haaretz claimed, “…invisible boundaries north and south of the corridor appear frequently in testimonies. Even soldiers manning ambush positions say they weren't always clear where these lines were drawn.” My source said that it is true that the definitions of what constituted a threat varied. This depended on where they took up their positions, weather-induced visibility variations, intelligence warnings, whether buildings that had previously shielded them from sniper fire had been suddenly razed, and so forth.

He thinks Haaretz’s implication, that the IDF kept changing the rules in order to trap and kill unwitting Gazan civilians, is nonsense. During his time there, the IDF leafletted the whole area heavily, and civilians knew that they had no business getting close to the Corridor. And from his experience, civilians stayed away.

According to him, the article’s description of the corridor as a mass killing zone is unrealistic, if only because there are relatively few violent encounters between the IDF and Gazans in the Corridor area. The only time he encountered civilians was during a raid north of the corridor, in Gaza City. In that case, the troops made a point of hailing the civilians and directing them southwards to safety, before closing in.

Soldier 2

This soldier is an acting officer in a patrol unit that has had three different stints in the Netzarim Corridor, including a two-month tour that ended just a few weeks ago.

He described the corridor as being divided into roughly two zones: the area the troops physically occupy, and an outer defensive zone. His own patrol unit, consisting of spotters, drone operators and snipers, acted as the division’s eyes and ears, keeping a close watch over the outer zone.

When someone entered that defensive perimeter, the troops would occasionally ask a tank or sniper to maintain observation of the intruder, but they were not allowed to open fire unless the intruder clearly demonstrated combatant status.

He described one incident when his drone operator spotted a group of men who seemed to be holding some kind of conference. A man on a motorbike joined the group and drew their attention to the IDF drone. The band scattered in pairs, and regrouped a few minutes later.

This information was passed up the chain of command, and a drone was sent to watch the group, but that was the only action taken. The spotter had not seen anyone in the group carrying weapons or engaging in obvious military activity, so under IDF rules of engagement they could not open fire. This is a far stricter rule than I observed at times in Afghanistan: on occasions under rule of engagement 429A, we were allowed to shoot to kill even if we only suspected someone was observing us with nefarious intent. All entirely legal.

This officer reports that during their last two-month deployment in Gaza, there were fewer than five cases when his unit’s sightings led to the IDF opening fire—and his unit reported countless sightings in the neighbourhood.

If someone sneaks into the inner zone, soldiers must employ the IDF’s Arrest Protocol, which involves calling on the suspect to stop (in both Hebrew and Arabic), firing a warning shot, and then firing at the suspect’s legs if necessary—unless, of course, the infiltrator is clearly a combatant.

As for the Haaretz article’s description of units trying to top one other’s kill totals, he claims that is a wilful misrepresentation of the situation. Yes, there is healthy competition between the various units. Each one wants to do its job, and one unit’s success does motivate the others to seize their opportunity should it come. But that is a far cry from Haaretz’s description. And, unsurprisingly, he pooh-poohed Haaretz’s description of IDF Brigadier General Yehuda Vach being able to carry out unauthorised, large-scale manoeuvres. “That’s not how the IDF works.”

When shown the Haaretz article, he shook his head and laughed. He said, at one point, when his unit was suffering from a shortage of men, they had a new batch of reservists forced on them—including a 41 year-old who had used his connections to worm his way to the front, despite being age-exempt from reserve duty. That man clearly had no interest in soldiering. He arrived wearing an anti-war shirt and spent his short time in the unit arguing with everyone over politics, and taking pictures of the semi-destroyed buildings around him. He then proceeded to write a heart-wrenching article in Haaretz about the terrible destruction of Gaza and the abuse he had faced from his fellow reservists for being a principled, decent human being.

Destroyed houses in the Netzarim corridor area, April.Credit: Ashraf Amra / ANADOLU / Anadolu / AFP

Of course, this article is not trying to claim that no war crimes have happened in Gaza. Of course they have: the IDF has told me they are investigating over 100 of the 300,000 IDF soldiers they have posted through Gaza. I have interviewed IDF soldiers myself who have admitted to witnessing behaviour that fell far short of both rules of engagement and the IDF’s code of conduct. But, as today’s revelations about the British SAS show, this is not solely an IDF phenomenon. As I have written before, armies recruit from societies. Societies contain both good and bad people. Some bad people will make it into uniform and do bad things—and we cannot discount the unknown effects of the terror, fear and adrenaline of war zone combat on those who are thrust into its horrors, that might lead them to behave in unexpected and unethical ways.

So, there may be kernels of truth in Haaretz’s article: in fact, I am sure there are. But the phrasing and unbalanced portrayal of the IDF in Gaza make the article shameless manipulation masquerading as fair reporting, in pursuit of Haaretz’s well-established political position. This is a war desperately in need of analysis with shaded nuance. Haaretz’s article provides only unfair black and white.