Last night, in a statement on the Iranian missile attacks on Israel, the British Prime Minister said that he is “deeply concerned that the region is on the brink”. It is deeply concerning that the British PM does not understand that Israel has been at war with Iran since 7th October last year. There is no risk of a regional war: a regional war has been ongoing since October 2023.
In September 2021, Iran’s plan for Israel was made clear by the words of General Gholamani Rashid:
“May God have mercy upon the martyr Hajj Qasem Soleimani. Three months before his martyrdom, at a meeting of the Khatam Al-Alanbiya HQ, with the commanders of the armed forces, he said: 'My dear [comrades], with the backing of the IRGC command, the army command, the general command of the armed forces, and of the Defense Ministry: I have assembled for you six armies outside of Iran's territory, and I have created a corridor 1,500km long and 1,000km wide, all the way to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. In this corridor, there are six religiously devout and popular divisions. Any enemy that decides to fight against the Islamic Revolution, and against the sacred regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran, will have to go through these six armies. It won't be able to do so.
"'One army is in Lebanon. It is called Hizbullah. Another army is in Palestine, and it is called Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. One army is in Syria. Another army is in Iraq, and is called the PMU, and another army is in Yemen and is called Ansar Allah [Houthis.]'
"This has created deterrence in the service of our dear Iran. The anger of the trespassing Americans and of the Zionist regime with regard to Iran's regional power stems from their realization that the Islamic Republic of Iran possesses two elements of power: The first is a powerful armed force which is ready for battle, and prepared to defend from within Iran's territory against any foreign invader, and the second is a regional force outside of Iran's territory."[1]
This final paragraph is key. Gholamani articulates Iranian strategy in the Middle East. The Iranian Regime aims to drive out American influence, with the eradication of Israel as the first stage in the plan. This will enable them to exert their own hegemony over the Middle East.
The disaster of the 2003 Iraq War opened the door for Iran to expand their influence in the Middle East. This war saw the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, who was holding in check a Shia majority population by means of a brutal Sunni minority regime. In his demise, the USA and their allies created a governance vortex that was filled by Iranian-sympathetic Shia politicians. The ISIS crisis in 2013-14 also enabled Iran to establish militias in Iraq that rivalled the Iraqi Army in size. Through the US unbalancing the region by removing Iraq as a key bulwark against Iran, the regime in Tehran has had an open door to expand their network of proxies as part of their regional strategy.
This regional exploitation has seen the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-backed Houthis established in Yemen, increased arming of Hezbollah in Lebanon using a supply corridor through Syria, extensive involvement in the Syrian civil war itself, and the provision of arms to Palestinian opposition groups in the West Bank and Gaza—all of which came to a head on 7th October, 2023 when Hamas launched their surprise attack on Israel.
It is suggested that Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’ leader, began operations too soon and caught the other Iranian proxies and allies off guard. The IDF told me they had expected a 7th October-type attack, but in the North from Hezbollah’s Radwan Force rather than Hamas’ Nukhba forces in the South. Nevertheless, within 24 hours, on 8th October, Hezbollah began an onslaught of missiles into northern Israel of more than 9,000 rockets in nearly a year, displacing over 60,000 Israeli citizens from their homes.
The question is often asked: why now? Whilst Hezbollah claim they are firing in a response of solidarity against Israeli action in Gaza, their attacks on Israel began before any Israeli retribution against Hamas commenced. The Abraham Accords almost certainly play a key role in Iran’s decision to escalate attacks on Israel at this moment, and Hamas’ actions on 7th October gave them the opportunity.
Since the debacle of the Iraq War, US strategy in the Middle East has been multi-faceted, mostly prioritising economic and diplomatic levers over military force. It has evolved significantly over time, shaped by a combination of geopolitical, economic, and security interests. The shared goals of the US and their Gulf allies focus on maintaining regional stability, countering threats from Iran, combating terrorism, and securing energy supplies.
One of the central pillars of US and Gulf allies’ strategy has been to contain the influence of Iran. Iran’s support for militant groups, its involvement in proxy conflicts in Syria and Yemen, and its pursuit of nuclear capabilities are obvious threats to the stability of the region. The US has pursued diplomatic measures such as President Obama’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, economic sanctions, and military deterrence strategies to limit Iran’s nuclear ambitions and regional influence. They bolstered military deployments and partnerships in the Gulf, including arms sales and security cooperation agreements with key allies.
Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have taken an increasingly assertive stance, also engaging in proxy conflicts in Yemen and fostering anti-Iran coalitions like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). They also work closely with the US on intelligence sharing and regional security initiatives.
Counterterrorism has been a major focus, particularly in the wake of the rise of extremist groups like al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other jihadist networks. These groups threaten not only Western interests but also the internal stability of Gulf monarchies in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, which was brutally suppressed in countries like Bahrain.
The US has led efforts to dismantle terrorist organisations through direct military intervention, intelligence operations, drone strikes, and special operations forces. However, crucially, in recent years, the US has worked to limit its ground presence, relying more on regional partners for on-the-ground operations. These regional partners have increased their internal counterterrorism measures, cracking down on extremist financing and recruitment. They have also supported US-led coalitions against groups like ISIS, participating in airstrikes and intelligence cooperation. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has spearheaded anti-terror initiatives, including efforts to counter extremist ideology, seeing a sea change in their domestic policies, including their approach to women’s rights.
The US and Gulf states have taken an active role in several ongoing conflicts in the region, aiming to maintain stability while countering influences detrimental to their interests, particularly Iranian involvement in places like Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. The US has played a complex role in these conflicts, seeking to reduce direct military involvement under recent administrations, while providing support through arms, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts. The US continues to support the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, albeit cautiously due to humanitarian concerns. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE have been directly involved in this conflict where they aim to counter Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. Their strategy involves a mix of military engagement, political influence, and economic aid to shore up allies and weaken Iran’s regional footholds.
Energy security, particularly the stability of oil and gas supplies, remains a cornerstone of the US-Gulf alliance. The Gulf region is plainly crucial to the global energy market and US economic interests. While the US has reduced its direct reliance on Gulf oil due to domestic production increases, it continues to prioritise the security of global energy supply routes. The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, stationed in Bahrain, plays a key role in securing the Strait of Hormuz, a vital chokepoint for global oil shipments.
Saudi Arabia continues to play a leading role in the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), influencing global oil prices. They have sought to balance production levels to ensure both economic growth and regional stability, while aligning with US efforts to ensure the free flow of energy resources.
The US has sought to build a regional coalition of partners to help share the burden of security in the Middle East. This has included encouraging normalisation of relations between Arab states and Israel, thereby shifting focus from Arab-Israeli conflicts to the common threat of Iran. The 2020 Abraham Accords, brokered by the Trump administration, are the key example of this strategy. These agreements were a revolution in relations between Israel and several Gulf and Arab states, including the UAE and Bahrain, marking a significant shift in regional dynamics. While Saudi Arabia has not yet fully embraced this rapprochement with Israel, they have shown a willingness to engage in quieter cooperation on mutual security concerns. Countries like the UAE have actively pursued normalisation, both for economic benefits and to counterbalance Iranian influence.
Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu has always harboured political-strategic aims of creating a renewable energy pathway from the Middle East, through Israel, to Europe as a means of creating a path to peace through shared economic growth to strengthen the bonds between Israel and its neighbours. Despite sanctions, in recent years 50% to 70% of Iran’s total exports come from oil and gas, representing some 25% of their GDP, depending on market prices. As the world moves to a post-carbon fuel era, this Israeli plan represents a clear economic threat to Iran. This threat was amplified by the Abraham Accords and made more likely by closer cooperation between Israel and Gulf state partners.
My contention is that Iran saw the Abraham Accords as a step too far, and normalisation of relations, especially potentially with Saudi Arabia, was not only strategically threatening but also religiously abhorrent to see Muslims reconcile with the Jewish State. As Gholamani articulated, Iran has always seen the removal of Israel as the second stage of their regional hegemony strategy to remove US influence from the region, after the establishment of their proxy noose around Israel’s borders. 7th October, therefore, gave Iran an opportunity to accelerate their response to the US and their allies’ economic and military attempts to neuter Iranian ambitions.
For more than 11 months until 17-18th September 2023, the situation in Lebanon was a game of tit-for-tat with rockets exchanged for air strikes and limited Special Forces ground operations. Hezbollah continued to fire rockets into Israel, taking no care for civilian lives, including killing 12 Druze children playing football in Majdal Shams on 27th July. This strike sparked an increased period of escalation that has culminated in the situation at the time of writing.
Since rocket fire began on 8th October 2023, Israel responded with air strikes targeting Hezbollah strategic rocket capabilities to strike Israel, and Hezbollah commanders. Most notably, Israel killed Hezbollah’s military Jihadi Council member and commander of Hezbollah’s troops in southern Lebanon, Fouad Shukur, in an airstrike on 30th July. Hezbollah’s attempted massed rocket response to Shukur’s assassination was pre-empted by the IDF on 24th August, with the IDF claiming the destruction of hundreds of launchers and thousands of rockets.
Prior to the phase of operations ongoing at the time of writing, Israeli intelligence services allegedly carried out the most remarkable operation of modern times, finding a way to detonate Hezbollah’s pager and walkie-talkie system, causing some 3,000 casualties amongst Hezbollah operatives. This was followed by an unprecedented barrage of air strikes across Lebanon, targeting key Hezbollah commanders, including killing their longtime leader and totemic figurehead since 1992, Hassan Nasrallah.
There were tensions at the top of the Israeli government over the correct response to the threat from Lebanon. In Tel Aviv and Jerusalem earlier in September this year, I was briefed diametrically opposite plans by PM Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant themselves. Netanyahu was adamant that the Gaza conflict should be finished first as the most geographically proximate threat to Israeli security. From the start of the war, Gallant had wanted to deal with Hezbollah before Hamas, as the greater, better-armed threat. He favoured a ceasefire deal in Gaza so that Israeli strategy could pivot to the Northern Front. It appears that a third way has been found. Israel retains a presence in Gaza, with 162nd Division holding both movement corridors, Philadelphi and Netzarim. 98th Division has moved north and at the time of writing is undertaking a “limited, localised and targeted” ground manoeuvre operation in southern Lebanon, according to IDF spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner.
The IDF have also taken the fight to Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen. In response to a Houthi drone strike on Tel Aviv, a daring daylight air strike on Hodeida port in Yemen destroyed Iranian weapons. Israel conducted a further attack on Hodeida as part of the current round of escalation. These two raids showed Israel’s strategic reach: Hodeida is 1,800km from Israel. Tehran is only 1,600km. On 31st July, Israel showed their ability to target Tehran indirectly through an explosive device that killed Hamas’ political leader, Ismael Haniyeh. This security infiltration of the Iranian regime was reinforced by the two demonstrations of force in Yemen, showing that Israel has both the reach and the means to strike any target it wishes within Iran itself. PM Netanyahu emphasised that message on 30th September, as he addressed the people of Iran: “There is nowhere in the Middle East Israel cannot reach. There's nowhere we will not go to protect our people and protect our country… When Iran is finally free and that moment will come a lot sooner than people think -- everything will be different.”
Hezbollah are Iran’s strategically most important proxy. Iran relied on Hezbollah’s ability to fire massed rockets into Israel as their deterrent defence against Israeli direct strikes on Iranian soil. Iranian domestic defences are not strong. Their new Azarakhsh air defence systems are untested and are unlikely to defeat the stealth capability of IDF F-35s. The Iranian air force still flies 1970’s-era Mig-29, Mirage F1, F-4 and F-14 fighters, and 1950’s-era F-5s. These are no match at all for the IDF’s F-35s, F-15s and F-16s. Without Hezbollah, Iran is not defenceless, but they are more vulnerable than at any time since the end of the Iran-Iraq War.
Israeli operations of the last two weeks have inflicted savage wounds on Hezbollah, but they are not defeated and still retain an estimated 50% of the 130,000+ rockets they had at the start of the war. We are still seeing rocket attacks on Israel. However, their command and control is gravely damaged, with the entirety of their senior leadership killed, and they are helpless in the face of the IDF’s aerial onslaught.
Israel’s strategic goals in Lebanon seem clear, at this point. They aim to clear or destroy known Hezbollah firing points and tunnels within direct rocket range of abandoned Israeli habitations in the North, allowing the displaced Israeli citizenry to return home. A second goal appears to be removing any capability to attempt a 7th October-style attack by Hezbollah Radwan forces. The third goal will be the restoration of Israeli deterrence: to force Hezbollah to think twice before attacking Israel again, knowing the likely military consequences. It remains to be seen if this strategy will succeed.
More interestingly, yesterday, open-source intelligence reports that Israel struck 5 air defence sites in Southern Syria: radar at Thaalah airbase, early warning systems at Tell Kharouf, an air defence base near Izraa, and radar sites near Sanamayn and Khalkhalah. Allegedly this means the entirety of south Syrian early warning systems are out of service, creating a direct air corridor from Israel to Iran. In combination with Netanyahu’s speech on 30th September, and the Iranian missile strike on Israel on 1st October, it is inevitable that Israel will strike back against Iran. The question is, how far will Israel go in response?
After the demonstrable failure of their massed rocket attack on Israel in April 2024, Iran’s response options to Israeli escalation have always been limited. Iran’s missile attack last night was another failure, once again showing the deep weakness of Iranian capabilities. The attack once again galvanised Israel’s allies to assist in their defence and missiles struck very few intended targets, inflicting fewer casualties than one day of the Notting Hill Carnival weekend.
Iran’s only real direct choices at this point are to keep trying with futile missile attacks, risking diplomatic and economic consequences as well as inevitable Israeli retaliation; accept the humiliation of the failure of their proxy strategy; or to rush for nuclear weapons. A fourth, indirect, option will be to continue to send arms to Palestinian Arab dissidents in the West Bank in the hope of fomenting a Third Intifada and marauding terror attacks in Israel, as we saw yesterday in Tel Aviv.
On 19th July, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken warned that Iran is only one-to-weeks from producing enough weapons grade material for a nuclear weapon. This would be an enormously risky move by Iran. Israel has made it clear in the past that Iran’s nuclear programme is infiltrated by Israeli intelligence. The Stuxnet cyber-attack on Iranian centrifuges in 2010 is estimated to have set their programme back by two years. In response to April’s missile attack on Israel, the IDF struck targets inside Iran, including a radar at the Natanz nuclear site: a clear message. We can expect to see much, much more than this in the coming days and weeks, as Israel selects its response to last night’s attacks. However, any rushed attempt by Iran to obtain nuclear weapons will draw immediate response from not only Israel, but possibly also the USA and other allies—if Israel does not strike nuclear sites in Iran as part of their imminent retaliation.
This regional war is not won for Israel. The Gaza conflict is ongoing. Hezbollah retain intent and capability to launch missiles into Israeli territory. However, Israeli strategic intent is clear and current operations represent a logical military course of action to achieve it, although the end state in Gaza remains uncertain and the danger of operations in Lebanon is a return to “mowing the grass” if Hezbollah return to positions cleared by the IDF once the IDF withdraw.
Iran remains the head of the snake, however. Whilst their proxy strategy has suffered a severe setback in recent weeks and whatever direct response Israel undertakes, they do retain other forces in Iraq, Yemen and Syria with which to respond against Israel. Should Iran opt to try for a nuclear weapon, however, the entire future of the Middle East will be shaped by the Israeli response.
[1] https://www.memri.org/tv/irgc-general-gholamali-rashid-hizbullah-hamas-pmu-houthis-defend-iranian-regime [accessed 1 Oct 24]
Wow. Superb detailed timely analysis. Pop a copy through Lammy's door ASAP.
An absolutely brilliant overview of the economic, military and religious dynamics across the Sunni/Shia world.